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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN LOUISIANA LAW:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: PART I--OFFER
SatU Litvinoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
Offer and Acceptance as Consent
Meanings of Consent
The consent of parties legally capable of contracting is one
of the requirements for a valid contract.' But the term consent,
in contractual matters, bears two different connotations. In one
sense, consent means the accord of the parties' wills on the
projected contract, the uniformity of their opinion, or the meet-
ing of their minds. In another and more restricted sense, consent
means each party's individual acquiescence to the conditions of
the projected contract,2 given with the intent of creating binding
legal effects.8 It is the first and broader sense that seems to have
been utilized in Article 1798 of the Louisiana Civil Code when
stating that "the will of both parties must unite on the same
point." The second and more restricted reference of the term
consent is clearly implied in Articles 1797 and 1800.
According to etymology, to consent means to will the same
thing that another wills and wishes us to will.4 It is submitted
that actually the two references of the term consent do not
differ in essence. Basically, when the term is used in the first
and broader sense, meaning the accord of the parties' wills,
what is meant is the identity of what the parties had in mind.
Their minds are supposed to meet because they are aimed
at the same thing. When the term is used in the second and
more restricted reference, attention is focused on what each
of the parties had in mind. Since no contract will result unless
*Of the Louisiana State University Law School faculty.
1. LA. Cimi CODE art. 1779 (1870): "Four requisites to the validity of a
contract are: 1. Parties legally capable of contracting. 2. Their con8ent
legally given. 3. A certain object, which forms the matter of agreement.
4. A lawful purpose." (Emphasis added.)
2. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAMrr PRATIQuE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--
OBLIGATIONS-PART 1 99 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
3. LA. CvmL CODE art. 1799 (1870): "It is a presumption of law that In
every contract each party has agreed to confer on the other the right
of judicially enforcing the performance of the agreement, unless the con-
trary be expressed, or may be implied." See 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CvI
FRANVAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 323 (1833).
4. See 3 TouLum, La DRorr CwnM FRANAIS SUIVANT L'ORDnn DU CODE 322
(1833).
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some unity can be reasonably predicated on what both parties
had in mind, no particular importance can be attached to the
distinction between the two meanings of the term consent.5
Irrespective of the reference in which the term consent
is used, its real significance cannot be discussed until the con-
cept of consent is analyzed in its component parts-offer and
acceptance." In the clear language of the Louisiana Civil Code,
consent, being a mere operation of the mind, can have no effect
unless it be evinced in some manner that shall cause it to be
understood by the other parties to the contract.7 As the contract
consists of a proposition and the consent to it, the agreement
is incomplete until the acceptance of the person to whom it is
proposed. s If the one who proposes should change his intention
before that consent is given, the concurrence of the two wills is
wanting and there is no contract.9
Elements of Consent
No particular form is required for the offer or the accep-
tance.,10 Either of them, the offer, as well as the acceptance of
a contract, may be express, implied or tacit: express when
evinced by words, either written or spoken; implied when mani-
fested by actions; tacit when evidenced by silence or inaction,
or when the circumstances of a particular situation, or a legal
5. In Bender v. International Paint Co., 237 La. 569, 111 So.2d 775
(1959), and Clark Warehouse & Implement Co. v. Jacques & Edmond Well,
Inc., 152 La. 745, 94 So. 376 (1922), the court seems to imply the first and
broader reference of the term consent.6. See 1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS (AN
EINGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 304 (1965);
2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE. (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) PART I, no. 970, at 562 (1959).
7. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 1797 (1870).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1800 (1870). See TOULLIER, Ls DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIE
SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 323 (1833).
9. Id.
10. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY THE LOUISIANA STATs LAw INSTITUTE) no. 969, at 561 (1959): "Thus tickets
bearing only the price of an object exposed for sale in a store constitute an
offer to sell the merchandise for the price marked and the first customer
who consents to pay such price can exact its delivery. In some exceptional
cases a simple fact can constitute the offer to contract. He who stations
public carriages in the streets and places of the city is considered as offer-
ing them to the public at the price of the tariff. Consequently the act of the
traveller who takes a place in the carriage, offering to pay the price, is the
conclusion of the contract . . . " Id. at 562.
A French decree of June 24, 1958, punishes the refusal to sell any mer-
chandise or service by a professional merchant. The implication is that the
mere fact of establishing himself as vendor amounts to a general offer to
sell his merchandise to the public. See SAVATIER, LA TH§ORIM DES OBLIGATIONS
144 (1967).
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presumption directs the consideration of actions, silence, or
inaction as evidence of consent." However, as an offer is an
indispensable element of that concurrence of the wills of which
the contract consists, it is of utmost importance to determine
whether a certain declaration of will amounts to a real offer
or is merely a declaration made without an intention of becom-
ing bound, such as a simple proposition, or a simple pollicita-
tion.12 The same problem exists when it is necessary to ascertain
whether a certain declaration amounts to an acceptance.
An offer is a proposal to do something or to refrain from
doing something in return for a counter-promise, an act, or for-
bearance. To be considered properly as such, the offer must
fulfill the following three requirements clearly established in
the Louisiana Civil Code:
(a) The design to give the other party the right of con-
cluding the contract by his assent.18
(b) The offeror's intention to obligate himself.14
(c) A serious intent.15
When requirement (a) is absent, the proposition cannot
be considered an offer, but an invitation to negotiate, or an
expression of willingness to receive an offer from the other
party. The intention required under (b) must be that of creat-
ing a legal obligation-and not one in the moral sense or a
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1811 (1870). See 3 TOULLIER, Lm Dnorr CIVIL FRANgAIS
SMVANT L'ORDRA DU CODE 327 (1833). See also Lyle Cashlon Co. v. McKendrick,
97 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (E.D. La. 1951): "The rule is that acceptance of the
contract as binding upon a party may be shown by his actions, and any
definite and unequivocal course of conduct disclosing that the party has
acceded or assented to it, is as binding on him as had he endorsed his assent
in formal writing." See also Diaz Trucking Service v. Kramer's Transfer &
Stor., 50 So.2d 71, 74 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951): "Any conduct of one party
to a contract for which the other party may reasonably draw the Inference
of a promise, is effective in law as such."
In general terms, the consent Is express where words, written or spoken,
or any other signs or gestures are used to manifest it. It is Implied, when
deduced from facts, even negative, such as omissions. See 1 DEMOOUE, TRAITb
DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENARAL 295 (1923). See also 2 PuIG BRITAU, FUNDAMENTOS
Da DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 82-83 (1954), where a distinction between express
tacit, and Implied consent is suggested. Tacit would be the consent implied
in fact. The expression "implied (presumed) consent," is reserved for those
instances where it is implied in law. This threefold classification seems to
fit very well the provisions of LA. ClVIL CODE art. 1811 (1870).
12. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS EL]MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 34
(10th ed. 1953); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE Di DRoiT CIVIL FRANgAiS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 143 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
13. LA. CvL CODE art. 1802 (1870). See also arts. 1799 and 1803.
14. Id. art. 1813.
15. Id. art. 1815.
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duty in conscience. 16 Requirement (c) will exclude, as a real
offer, a proposition made in jest,'7 as a part of a game, or at the
peak of an argument. It is, however, necessary that the joke
or game be in accord with the circumstances or usages; other-
wise, if the addressee of such a proposition could have reason
to assume it to be a real offer, his acceptance would create a
contract. 18
Thus, in matters of everyday practices and dealings, it has
been decided that a quotation of prices is not an offer to sell
in the sense that a completed contract will arise out of the
mere acceptance of the rate offered, or the giving of an order
for merchandise in accordance with the proposed terms.' But
when a merchant, on request, sends a price list to a customer
who orders goods in accordance with the price list, there is a
contract formed between them for the price and upon condi-
tions mentioned in the price list.2 The surrounding circum-
stances explain sufficiently the difference between the two situa-
tions: with merchants, the sending of a price list implies the
intention to contract on its terms, while with persons who are
not merchants, a quotation of a price implies no such intention.
It has also been decided that an advertisement published in
a newspaper may constitute an offer, the acceptance of which
creates an obligation to perform in accordance with the terms
of the offer.21
16. Oiv. Nov. 14, 1883, S. 85, 1, 111: The obligation of a religious congrega-
tion to return a nun's monastic dowry if she leaves convent life was con-
sidered an engagement d'honneur, and not a legal obligation; Req., Dec. 4,
1929, D.HL 1930, 3 GAz. PAL. 1, 84 (1930): The one who takes an injured person
to a doctor does not intend to obligate himself personally, but is acting out
of pure humanity. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArTI PRATIQUE DE DRoIT CIVIL
FANgAIs--OBuATioNs-PART I 143-44 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
17. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUO DE DRoiT CIVIL FRANgAIs-OBGA-
TIONS-PART I (2d ed. Esmeln 1952).
18. Id. at 144.
19. Leonval v. McCall, 4 Orl. App. 351 (1907): "It requires the ac-
ceptance by the one naming the price of the order so named to complete the
transaction. Until thus completed, there is no mutuality of obligation."
Accord, Courteen Seed Co. v. Abraham, 129 Ore. 427, 275 Pac. 684 (1929);
Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, 98 Neb. 89, 152 N.W. 310 (1915).
20. Pere v. Dalgarn, 3 La. App. 775 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1926).
21. Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So.2d 858 (La. App. 1st CMr. 1965);
Johnson v. Capital City Ford, Inc., 85 So.2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955). The
first case involved an offer of employment, the second, the sale of a car, but
under rather special circumstances. In common law jurisdictions, advertise-
ments or circular letters in relation to the sale of goods are usually inter-
preted as being mere Invitations for offers: Lovett v. Frederick Loeser &
Co., 124 Misc. 81, 207 N.Y. Supp. 753 (1924); Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, 98
Neb. 89, 152 N.W. 310 (1915). But see Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Sur-
plus Store, 251 Minn. 188, 191, 86 N.W. 2d 689, 691 (1957): "The test of
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Specifications for Consent
Express Consent
In the cases where consent is express it must be given in
language understood by the party who accepts, and the words
that convey the expression of consent must be in themselves
unequivocal.22 Otherwise, if the words chosen mean different
things, such words could give rise to error which, as a vice,
will cause the consent to be null.2 But even when the words
chosen are unequivocal and expressive of assent they may not
create an obligation when from the context in which such words
were written or spoken it appears that the party did not intend
to obligate himself.24 Therefore, it will devolve upon the party
who relies on them to establish that a certain agreement was
intended to create a legal obligation, that is, that the parties
to it seriously contemplated the creation of legal rights and
duties.25
If the words are unequivocal but only expressive of mere
intent, they cannot form an obligation.26 Thus, the mere expres-
sion of a certain intention to do something does not form the
basis of a contract,27 nor is a mere statement of desire considered
as giving rise to an obligation.28
The parties' intent to contract must be serious.2 9 A positive
promise made in a manner that shows the lack of serious intent
whether a binding obligation may originate in advertisements addressed to
the general public is 'whether the facts show that some performance was
promised in positive terms in return for something requested." 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 27 (rev. ed. 1936). See generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 3 23
(1932).
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1812 (1870).
23. Id. arts. 1812, 1820, and 1822.
24. Id. art. 1813. See also id. art. 1799.
25. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 10 Orl. App. 212
(1913).
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1814 (1870).
27. Caldwell v. Turner, 129 La. 19, 55 So. 695 (1911): "A mere expression
on the part of a deceased person of her intention to provide for a friend in
her will does not form the basis of a contract; and it is not a will."
28. Brown v. Lagemann's Succession, 192 So. 543 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940): "No recovery could be had against the succession on alleged agree-
ment contained in written instrument which set forth no promise to pay,
but merely stated that decedent in case of death wanted plaintiff's wife to
be paid a stipulated amount for services rendered." See also Hello World
Broadcasting Corp. v. International Broadcasting Corp., 186 La. 589, 173 So.
115 (1937): "Statements of intention made to third persons cannot generally
be considered as offers or promissory expressions."
29. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAr PRATIQUE Do DR= CruL FRANgAIS-Olu-
GATIONS-PART I 105 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
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to contract will not create an obligation. An offer or an accept-
ance made in jest falls within this category.8°
Implied Consent
But words, either written or spoken, are not always neces-
sary as vehicles of consent. In some instances mere actions-
words excluded-will serve as evidence of consent to a contract
provided they are done under circumstances that, in a natural
way, carry that implication.81 Clear examples of this type of
situation are found in Louisiana Civil Code Article 1816: (1)
To use goods received from a merchant without any express
promise implies a contract to pay the value,82 (2) If an offer is
made for an article in deposit, and the article is received, the
contract of deposit is complete,8 (3) If a mandate is acted on,
the mandatory is bound in the same manner as if he had accepted
in writing. 4 In situations of this sort, all the terms that the
one making the proposition or the delivery attaches to the
acceptance of the proposition, or reception of the thing, are
presumed to have been accepted by the act of receiving. Ac-
cording to the code example: "If the merchant, in delivering
the goods, declare that they must be paid for by a certain time;
if the depositor designate how the deposit is to be kept, or the
mandator in what manner his commission is to be executed,
he who receives and acts is obligated to the performance of all
30. Consent given jocandi causa, or animus Jocandi. Also cases where
one of the parties enters the contract with a mental reservation known by
the other party. An obligation subject to a potestative condition-condictio
sio voluero-should also be considered as falling within the purview of
LA. CIVIL CODm art. 1815 (1870). See also LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2024, 2034, 2035
and 2036 (1870).
31. Id. art. 1816.
32. Id. arts. 2441 and 2550. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3) (c)
(1962); id at Comment 2: "Receipt and acceptance either of goods or of the
price constitutes an unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a
contract actually exists."
33. LA. CIVIL CODS art. 2926 (1870): "A deposit, in general, is an act by
which a person received the property of another, binding himself to pre-
serve it and return it in kind." Id. art. 2933: "The voluntary deposit can
only be regularly made by the owner of the thing deposited, or with his
consent expressed or implied. Consent is implied when the owner has carried
or sent the thing to the depositary, and the latter knowing that the thing
had been sent, has not refused to receive it." See 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 328 (1833).
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2985 (1870): "A mandate, procuration or letter
of' attorney is an act by which one person gives power to another to transact
for him and in his name, one or several affairs." Id. art. 2989: "A power
of attorney may be accepted expressly in the act itself, or by a posterior
act. It may also be accepted tacitly; and this tacit acceptance is inferred,
either from the mandatary acting under it, or from his keeping silence when
the act containing his appointment is transmitted to him."
[Vol. XXVMI
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these conditions. '8 5 In all these cases the contractual will of
the party performing a certain act, his consent, is presumed
by the law. But where the law does not create a legal presump-
tion of consent as arising from certain facts or when no pre-
sumption has been anticipated in the text of the law, then, as in
other simple presumptions, it must be left to judicial discretion
to ascertain whether the parties', or one party's, consent is to
be implied from them.8 6
Tacit Consent
There are situations where no words, either written or
spoken, have been exchanged by the parties, nor specific acts
carrying the implication of consent are performed by them,
but an obligation will arise out of mere silence or inaction. In
other words, not to speak or not to do, under certain circum-
stances, will be considered as evidence of consent.31 In the
code example, if, after the termination of a lease, the lessee
continues in possession, and the lessor remains inactive and
silent, a complete mutual obligation for continuing the lease is
created by the act of occupancy of the tenant on the one side,
and the inaction and silence of the lessor on the other.m
The example chosen by the Code is one of tacit reconduc-
tion, or the extension of a contract for an additional period -of
time due to silence or inaction of one of the parties. But in all
those or related cases where silence or inaction has to be evalu-
ated as being evidence of consent, the relevant factors are the
surrounding circumstances, since it is in them that the real
meaning of the silence or the inaction is to be found. 9
As an old adage goes: "qui ne dit mot consent."4 But it
would be very dangerous to allow unrestricted operation of the
principle contained in the old saying. If that were the case,
a duty to answer would be imposed upon the addressee of a
proposition who would be considered bound unless he signified
35. Id. art. 1816.
86. Id. art. 1818. See 3 Toumm, I DRorr CIVM FANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRU
DU CODa 328 (1833).
37. LA. QviL CODE art. 1817 (1870).
38. Id. See also id. arts. 2688 and 2689.
39. 6 PLAMOL & RIPERT, TRArrb PRATIQUO DE DRorr Cnn, FRANgAIS--OBLI-
GATIONS-PART I 115 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); 2 Puio BRUTAU, F UNDAMBNTOS DO
DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 84 (1954).
40. He who does not speak assents. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT.
PRATIQUE DE DR0T CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS--PART I 116 (2d ed. Esmein
1952).
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his dissent. But no such conclusion can be validly reached. The
lack of formalities for the expression of consent cannot be
pushed so far as to abandon the requirement of establishing the
factual existence of the consent.4' Therefore, in case of doubt
consent should not be inferred from silence when no other cir-
cumstances lend support to the presumption. French jurispru-
dence asserts that, in default of any other surrounding circum-
stances, silence alone does not suffice as proof against the one'
subject to the alleged obligation.4 2 In German doctrine a prin-
ciple is supported according to which silence will amount to
consent only when the party who remains silent knows that his
silence could be interpreted as consent. If such is the case, his
contrary intent, or mental reservation, will be of no avail."
Only when surrounded by sufficiently clear corroborating
circumstances, should silence or inaction be taken as acquiescence
to a proposition, such as:
(1) Where the parties have agreed expressly that the silence
of one of them shall be taken as acceptance of the other's prop-
osition or where the parties have stipulated that a certain
contract entered into by them for a certain duration may be
extended for a determined or undetermined additional period
of time in default of notice of termination before a certain term.
(2) Where previous transactions between the parties allow
the court to interpret the silence of one of them as acceptance
of the other's proposition, for instance, when, against the back-
ground of a certain business relationship one of the parties
41. Id. at 117.
42. D. Jur. gdt., avpp.. vO Obligat4ons, no 29, S. 84, 2, 190 GA& PAL 93, ,
162.
43. 1 ENNEciRUs-NIPPRDRY, ALLoEMEINER TlL, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RzCHTS, PART II 644 (1955). See also 2 Puio BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DI DERECHO
CVI, PART I 88 (1954). The same principle seems to be supported by Louisi-
ana jurisprudence. See Rahler v. Rester, 11 So.2d 87, 89 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1943): "Although the thing purchased by the wife is not a necessity in the
sense of Article 120 of the Civil Code, the husband nevertheless can be held
liable if he knew of the purchase and did nothing at the time the same was
made to repudiate the debt and permitted the article purchased to be used
for the benefit of the community. In such instance his silence and inaction
are circumstance showing consent and ratification." See also Godbold v.
Harrison, 1 McGloin 31 (La. App. 1881). In this connection it is interesting
to notice Nso. Rmv. STAT. § 63-101 (1943): "No person in this state shall be
compelled to pay for any newspaper, magazine or other publication which
shall be mailed or sent to him without his having subscribed for or ordered
it, or which shall be mailed or sent to him after the time of his subscription
therefor has expired, notwithstanding that he may have received it." Similar
statutes are apparently in force in Florida, Oregon, and Washington, accord-
ing to FULLER & BAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 868 (1964).
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sends the other an order to be entered, or goods for sale, or
commissions a service to be rendered within the framework of
the traditional relation, and no express dissent is manifested by
the party receiving the order, goods, or commission.
(3) Where according to conventional usages or practices
of a certain trade the lack of an express rejection of a prop-
osition within a certain term is considered as acceptance.
The evaluation of the relevance of the surrounding circum-
stances, in cases of this kind, is left, of course, to the discretion
of the court."
Freedom of Form
Although no special formalities are required for the offer
or the acceptance, when the parties have agreed to reduce the
contract to writing it is necessary to ascertain their intentions.
Was it their intention to subordinate the final conclusion of
the contract to the making of the writing, thereby reserving
the privilege of withdrawing until the moment of signing, or
did they consider themselves bound from the moment their
wills concurred irrespective of the signing of a writing sup-
posed to take place afterwards? 45 In cases of the first kind,
the parties' intention must be closely carried out, and, there-
fore, they will not be bound if the contract is not reduced to
writing. The same conclusion should be reached when, in an
act under private signature or by exchanged letters, the parties
have agreed to make the contract by public act.
46
This is the distinction between a contract and the writing
that may contain it.47 In the clear language of the Louisiana
Civil Code:
44. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArrt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIOA-
TIONS-PART I 119-20 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72(1)
(1932): "[There is a contract] (b) Where the offeror has stated or given
the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence
or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to
accept the offer. (c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, the
offeree has given the offerer reason to understand that the silence or in-
action Is intended by the offeree as a manifestation of assent, and the offeror
does so understand." It can be said that civil and common law do not differ
In the basic principles underlying the doctrine of silence as expression of
contractual will.
45. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITr PRATIQUE DE DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-ORLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 123 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
46. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 973, at 564 (1965); see also 6 PLANIOL
& RIPERT, TRAITIR PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIs--OBLIGATIONS - PART I 123
(2d ed. Esmein 1952).
47. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1762 (1870). 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I
19671
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"The contract must not be confounded with the instrument
in writing by which it is witnessed. The contract may
subsist, although the written act may, for some defect, be
declared void; and the written act may be good and authen-
tic, although the contract it witnesses be illegal. The contract
itself is only void for some cause or defect determined by
law.,4 8
The German Civil Code provides that, in case of doubt, when
the parties have agreed upon reducing an agreement to writing,
the contract is considered not concluded if the instrument is not
written.49 In France, where the Code Napoleon does not contain
a similar provision, such a presumption is not admitted. On the
contrary, French jurisprudence decided that in situations of
this kind, the contract in principle is considered as definitive and
concluded, and not subordinated to the making of a written
instrument unless special circumstances indicate the contrary,
which must be determined by the court.50
In Louisiana, the Civil Code, as the Code Napoleon, does
not contain express provisions on this matter other than Article
1762, and the jurisprudence reached conclusions not entirely
dissimilar to the French decisions. As long ago as 1814 the
Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that: "It is elementary in
our law, that where the negotiations contemplate and provide
that there shall be a contract in writing, neither party is bound
until the writing is perfected and signed. The distinction is
manifest between those cases in which there is a complete
-verbal contract, which the law does not require to be reduced
to writing, and a subsequent agreement that it shall be reduced
to writing, and those in which, as in this case, it is a part of
(AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTrrUTE) no. 974,
at 564 (1965).
48. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1762 (1870).
49. BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 154 (1896). See also B.G.B. § 125. A similar
provision is found in the Swiss FEDERAL CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 16 (1911).
See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIOA-
TIONS-PART I 123 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). An interesting provision pertaining
to this subject is contained in the SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1279 (1889): "When
the law requires the execution of an authentic act or any other formality
in order to make effective the obligations arising out of a contract, the
parties may compel each other reciprocally to fulfill the formalities from
the moment consent was given and other requirements necessary for the
contract to be valid were fulfilled." A similar provision is found in the CIVIL
CODE OF PUERTO Rico art. 1246 (1902). See also 2 PuIG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS
DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 182 (1954).
50. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITfo PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 124 (2d ed. Esnein 1952); S. 69, 1, 465.
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the bargain that the contract shall be reduced to writing. In
the first class of cases the original verbal contract is in no
manner impaired by the failure to carry out the subsequent
agreement to put it in writing. In the second class of cases, the
final consent is suspended; the contract is inchoate, incomplete,
and it cannot be enforced until it is signed by all the parties."' 51
There is, certainly, no problem when the agreement to
reduce a contract to writing is subsequent to the original verbal
agreement concluded by the same parties. If such is the case,
the second and separate stipulation can be treated independently
of the previous stipulations making up the principal verbal and
binding agreement, as if it were a different contract-the object
of which is the first one.52 The breach of this second agreement
will not result in the invalidity of the previous one.
But the situation differs when the stipulation to reduce the
contract to writing is not subsequent to the original one but is
negotiated simultaneously. Here, it cannot be said that there is
a different contract. On the contrary, the parties entered into a
single agreement that must be taken as a whole5 and their
intentions must be scrutinized in order to ascertain the mate-
riality that the parties vested in the stipulation to reduce their
contract to writing.
The key to the solution, in situations of this second kind,
lies in Louisiana Civil Code Article 1764:
"All things that are not forbidden by law, may legally
become the subject of, or the motive for contracts; but
different agreements are governed by different rules,
adapted to the nature of each contract, to distinguish which
it is necessary in every contract to consider:
"1. That which is the essence of the contract, for the
want whereof there is either no contract at all, or a contract
of another description. Thus a price is essential to the
51. Vill6r6 v. Brognier, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 326, 349 (La. 1814); Accord, Larous-
sini v. Werlein, 52 La. Ann. 424, 27 So. 89 (1899); Fredericks v. Fasnacht, 30
La. Ann. 117 (1878); Bloeker v. Tillman, 4 La. 77 (1832); Des Boulets v.
Gravier, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 420 (1923).
52. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Whitworth, 116 La. 337, 40 So. 723 (1906); see
also LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1762 and 1885 (1870).
53. See Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So.2d 782
(1950); LA. CIvIL CoDE: art. 1955 (1870): "All clauses of agreements are inter-




contract of sale; if there be none, it is either no contract,
or if the consideration be other property, it is an exchange.
"2. Things which, although not essential to the contract,
yet are implied from the nature of such agreement, if no
stipulation be made respecting them, but which the parties
may expressly modify or renounce, without destroying the
contract or changing its description; of this nature is war-
ranty, which is implied in every sale, but which may be
modified or renounced, without changing the character of the
contract or destroying its effect.
"3. Accidental stipulations, which belong neither to the
essence nor the nature of the contract, but depend solely
on the will of the parties. The term given for the payment
of a loan, the place at which it is to be paid, and the nature
of the rent payable on a lease, are examples of accidental
stipulations.
"What belongs to the essence and to the nature of each
particular description of contract, is determined by the law
defining such contracts; accidental stipulations depend on
the will of the parties, regulated by the general rules apply-
ing to all contracts."
The clear doctrine of this article is that parties to a contract
are free to stipulate as they please, if their stipulations are not
contrary to good morals, public policy, or do not violate some
law. 4 Therefore, the contracting parties may make any stipula-
tions material to the contract.55 They are free to arrive at the
mutual understanding that a certain stipulation, which other-
wise would be considered accidental, is essential to their con-
tract. If that is the case, there will be no contract if one of the
elements, made essential by the parties' will, is wanting. This
is so even in cases in which such stipulations may seem to
be of little or no value to either party.56
The parties to a contract are equally free to characterize
a certain stipulation as an accidental one, in which case the
54. Morris Buick Co. v. Ray, 43 So.2d 83 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Epstein
v. Chaillot, Orl. No. 8783 (La. App. 1923).
55. Bank of Cotton Valley v. McInnis, 143 La. 436, 78 So. 727 (1918).
56. Id. See also Carrano v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Orl.
No. 7513 (La. App. 1919): "It lies within the power of contracting parties
to make any stipulation material to the contract; although such stipulation
may seem to be of little or no value to either party intelligently entering
into a binding contract."
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non-performance of the accidental stiDulation will not invariably
have the effect of abrogating the agreement, since such covenant
is not of the essence of a valid contract.57
As a consequence, when an agreement to reduce a contract
to writing is not clearly subsequent to an original verbal agree-
ment, but a stipulation contemporary with the principal stipula-
tions of the contract, the fact to be determined is whether the
parties considered it essential or accidental. It might be said
that, when there are no strong indications to the contrary, there
is a presumption that such a stipulation is accidental. 58 Such a
presumption is well founded in Article 1764 in the clear language
of which what belongs to the essence and to the nature of each
particular contract is determined by the law, and stipulations
that depend exclusively on the will of the parties are accidental.
57. Lillis v. Owens, 21 So.2d 185 (La. App, Orl. Cir. 1945); Andrus v.
Eunice Band Mill Co., 185 La. 403, 169 So. 449 (1936); Moore v. O'Bannon &
Julien, 128 La. 161, 52 So. 253, 255 (1910). See also Auto-Lee Stores, Inc. v.
Ouachita Valley Camp, 185 La. 876, 171 So. 62 (1936). In this case, the lessor
failed to sign a written lease at the time agreed upon. The lessee, notwith-
standing, upon his own signing thereof, went into possession of the premises
after delivering to the lessor a series of rent notes and continued to occupy
them for about two years and pay the rent notes as due. Plaintiff-lessee
allegedly sustained damages through the loss of a sub-lease resulting from
defendant-lessor's failure to sign a written lease. In suit instituted by lessee
the court said: "Under this state of facts, the agreement to lease was com-
plete; was carried out and acted upon to the letter; and thereby became an
executed contract. Defendant is as firmly bound as if the contract had been
reduced to writing and signed by it. The allegations of the petition, taken
as true, show, in our opinion, a cause of action for damages." Id. at 883,
171 So. at 64. In this case the court invoked art. 1764 as authority. It is clear
from this case that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for de-
fendant's nonperformance of an accidental stipulation which did not prevent
him being "as firmly bound as if the contract had been reduced to writing
and signed by it." But the court also justified plaintiff's action vacating the
premises before expiration of the contractual term, thereby creating some
doubts as to the court's real understanding of the nature of the stipulation.
In spite of this latter aspect, the correct doctrine was established, since all
cases of this kind should be contemplated in the light of art. 1764.
58. See Montague v. Weil, 30 La. Ann. 50 (1878): "The reduction of an
agreement to writing signed by the parties, is not necessary to its perfection
as a contract, unless it clearly appears that the parties intended thatl it
should not be complete as a contract until so written and signed." (Emphasis
added.) See also Avendano v. I. W. Arthur Co., 30 La. Ann. 316 (1870):
"Where the evidence shows that the parties intended, originally, that the
contract of lease should be reduced to writing, neither will be bound until
it is signed by both." See also Breaux Brothers Constr. Co. v. Associated
Contractors, Inc., 226 La. 720, 77 So.2d 17 (1954); Waldhauser v. Adams Hats,
207 La. 56, 20 So.2d 423 (1945); McIntire v. Industrial Sec. Corp., 158 So. 849
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935); Johnson v. Williams, 178 La. 891, 152 So. 556 (1934);
Reimann Constr. Co. v. Heinz, 17 La. App. 687, 137 So. 355 (Orl. Cir., 1931);
De Soto Bldg. Co. v. Kohnstamm, Orl. No. 7627 (La. App. 1919); Crescent
City Stock Yards & Slaughter House Co. v. Bosch & Martin, 12 Orl. App. 368
(La. App. 1915).
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Subjective Will and Objective Declaration
When one party proposes and the other assents, then the
obligation is complete, and by virtue of the right that each
party has impliedly given to the other, either may call for the
aid of the law to enforce it. 59 After the offer is accepted, the
parties are bound. In a language entirely consistent with tradi-
tion, it can be said that at that moment the parties have for-
mulated their own law.2
It is arguable whether the parties are bound according to
their real will, or according to their will as manifested, in cases
where differences are apparent between what was really intended
and what was actually declared."1 It is easy to understand that
this argument reflects the long-standing dispute between the
subjective and objective approach to contract.62 A classic theory
enhances the predominance of the real, the subjective, will,
and asserts that the declaration or manifestation of it has only
a secondary importance. It is necessary, then, to scrutinize care-
fully the real will in order to learn whether the contract was
actually formed, and, if that is the case, to interpret it. Another
doctrine asserts that the declared will should prevail. For those
who support this view, the formation of the contract is deter-
mined by the accord of the parties' declared will. The real will
of the parties, according to this theory, only exists in their soul
and, therefore, cannot enter the field of the law. There would
be no security of transactions if the one who manifests his will
59. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1803 (1870). See also id. art. 1799. Art. 1803 gives
recognition to what is, perhaps, the most important effect of obligations:
the quod adstringimur alicuis solvenda rel .ecundum lege civitate nostram
of the classic definition. It is Interesting to notice the treatment given the
same subject in the ARGENTIN CIvIL CODE art. 505 (1869): "The effects of
obligations, with respect to the creditor are the following:
"1. To give him the right to have recourse to legal measures
to compel the debtor to procure him that which he has
undertaken to procure.
"2. To cause it to be procured by another at the debtor's
cost.
"3. To recover damages from the debtor.
"With regard to the debtor, a specific performance of the obligation
gives him the right to obtain the proper discharge, or the right to contest
the actions of the creditor, if the obligation is extinguished or modified by
a legal cause."
60. LA. CIviL CoE arts. 1901, 1945 (1870). In this connection it is interest-
ing to notice the definition of contract contained in art. 1137 of the ARGENTINE
CIVIL CODE (1869): "There is a contract whenever several persons agree upon
a declaration of common will, designed to regulate their rights."
61. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArTT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 109 (2d ed. Esmeln 1952); 2 Puie BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DR
DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 92-99 (1954).
62. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 106, at 156 (1952).
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were not to be considered bound to the addressee of his declara-
tion in the terms and according to the meaning of the words
he chose.e
The supporters of the subjective will theory are anxious
to protect, above all, the freedom of determination of the parties
who engage in a contract. Those who adhere to the declared
will theory give greater weight to considerations of credit and
security of transactions, and, above all, to the necessity of not
injuring the confidence that one places in another's manifes-
tations.
But neither of these two approaches can be carried too far.
On the one hand, the declared will theory has not been adopted
in full in any modern legislation, not even in the German Civil
Code. Numerous restrictions and qualifications imposed upon
the operation of this theory evidence the insurmountable neces-
sity of understanding difficult determinations of intention, and
even psychological analysis. He who makes a voluntary declara-
tion ought to know, at the moment he makes it, that the nature
of his declaration is such as to permit the other party to believe
that he intends to bind himself. On the other hand, if it is
asserted that the real, the subjective, will is the true source
of obligations, it is nonetheless necessary to take into account
the declaration, the external manifestation of this will, because
the declaration is the only social, objective fact on which the
law can focus. 6 4
French jurisprudence attaches the binding force to the sub-
j ective will, and, in interpreting contracts according to Article
1156 of the Code Napoleon,65 French courts try to ascertain the
real intention of the parties beyond the literal sense of words.
They have tempered the strict theory of the subjective will by
resorting to several devices of interpretation. In the first place,
by applying rigorously the Code Napoleon rules on admissibility
of parol evidence " they do not allow proof of a real intention
63. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DRO1T CIVIL FRANAIS--
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 109 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
64. Id. at 110.
65. Similar to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1950 (1870): "When there is anything
doubtful in agreements, we must endeavor to ascertain what was the com-
mon intention of the parties, rather than to adhere to the literal sense of
the terms."
66. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1341, similar to LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2276 and 2277
(1870): "Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or beyond what
is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been said before, or at the
time of making them, or since." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2276 (1870).
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different from the intention expressed in writing. In the second
place, by extensive interpretation of the code rules on simula-
tion, 7 which forbid the one who makes a simulation to set up
a secret act against a third party, they make the declared inten-
tion prevalent over the real intention whenever the interest
of a third party is to be protected. Finally, a declaration of will
contrary to the real intention may constitute a fault of such a
nature as to render the one who makes the declaration respon-
sible in the event of the nullity of the contract.6
The dispute between the subjective will and the declared
will theories, the subjective and the objective approaches to
contract, is no longer realistic. A will that is purely subjective,
meaning that it was never expressed, is irrelevant in the eyes of
the law. Only the will that is declared or manifested, that which
materializes in an objective act, may start the operation of the
legal mechanism. Once this occurs, an act of human conduct
has taken place, and every person called to evaluate its meaning,
for instance, a judge, will have to take the act as one single
phenomenon, wherein a certain intention, a subjective element,
is thoroughly blended with a certain utterance, an objective
element. Either of those two elements, although susceptible of
being analytically isolated, is incomplete and insufficient when
not taken in the context of the whole. Each of them is a com-
ponent part that should never be mistaken for the whole.0 9
The intention illuminates the declaration, in the same manner
as the declaration purports to express the intention.
A more realistic approach to this subject calls for a dis-
tinction between intentional and unintentional differences in the
67. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1321, similar to LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2239 (1870):
"Counter letters can have no effect against creditors or bona fide purchasers;
they are valid as to all others; but forced heirs shall have the same right
to annul absolutely and by parol evidence the simulated contracts of those
from whom they inherit, and shall not be restricted to the legitime."
68. This is a case of culpa in contrahendo, where the fault is neither
contractual, nor delictual. See 1 DEMOGUE, TRAITh DES OBLIGATIONS EN GhNARAL
95-101 (1923); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANgAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 111 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); 2 PuIG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE
DERECHo CIVIL, PART I 254-58 (1954); see also Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo
in German, French and Louisiana Law, 15 TUL L. REv. 87-99 (1941). LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2452 (1870), can be interpreted as incorporating this doctrine:
"The sale of a thing belonging to another person is null; it may give rise
to damages, when the buyer knew not that the thing belonged to another
person."
69. 2 Puo BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CrVIL, PART I 95-112 (1954).
Llewellyn, What Price Contract ?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALv IJ. 704
(1931).
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subjective will and its declaration. 0 In the first case, when the
differences are intentional, the will as declared prevails over
the real intention for the benefit of the innocent party, and to
the detriment of the party chargeable with the intentional
difference.7 1 If both parties have contributed to the intentional
difference between the real will and the declared one, as in a
case of simulation, between the parties the real intention pre-
vails over the simulated one, not because it is the "subjective"
will, but because it is the "real" one. In effect, in these situa-
tions there is no case of a subjective and an objective will,
since it is obvious that each party made two different "declara-
tions" of will. One, the real declaration addressed to the other
party alone that the latter understands as the true statement
of intention. The other, the declaration of a simulated, fictitious
will, apparently addressed to the other party, but actually
intended as a notice to anyone. The other party understands
the simulated character of the second declaration; otherwise
it would not be possible to speak of a simulation at all.7 2 But,
if the declaration of a simulated will was executed in writing,
then no measure of proof will constitute convincing evidence
as to the real intention since parol evidence is not admissible
in such a situation." Counter letters can be set up by one party
of a simulation against the other, but can have no effect against
third parties in good faith.74
70. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 1186-1190 (1959); 2 Pue BERUTAU,
FUNDAMENTOS DR DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 100-03 (1954).
71. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1847(6) (1870) and art. 1958: "But if the doubt
or obscurity arise for the want of necessary explanation which one of the
parties ought to have given, or from any other negligence or fault of his, the
construction most favorable to the other party shall be adopted, whether he
be obligor or obligee." See Davis v. Lacaze, 181 La. 75, 158 So. 626 (1935),
followed Lacaze v. Atkins, 158 So. 876 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), where an agree-
ment for the substitution of a mortgage note for other collateral in creditor's
possession was held binding, notwithstanding the creditor's uncommunicated
mental reservation, when assenting to the substitution, that he was going
to look into the value of the mortgaged property.
72. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1186, at 676 (1959); 2 Puie BRuTAu,
FUNDAMENTOS On DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 100-03 (1954).
73. Which does not mean that only a writing may be admitted as evi-
dence. See Jones v. Jones, 214 La. 50, 36 So.2d 635 (1948); Sangassan v. San-
gassan, 181 La. 31, 158 So. 611 (1935); Hood v. Hood, 14 La. App. 424, 128 So.
546 (2d Cir. 1930); Phelps v. Mulhaupt, 146 La. 1078, 84 So. 362 (1920). In
connection with LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2291 (1870) and art. 347 of the CODE o0
PRACTICE (1870), see LA. CoD OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1491 (1960).
74. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2239 (1870). A simulation is not in itself a cause
of nullity. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 679 (1959). See Gravier's Curator v.
Carraby's Executor, 17 La. 118 (1841).
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When the differences between the subjective and the de-
clared will are unintentional, the right attitude consists in ascer-
taining whether the will as declared could have reasonably
led the other party to rely on it and not in speculating as to
which should prevail. This should not be understood as an
assertion that the declared will ought to prevail over the
subjective one, nor as an adoption of the objective approach.
On the contrary, it should be noticed that one party may be
justified in his reliance only when the declared will of the other
party is consistent with his presumed intention. This presump-
tion of certain intention is not complex if it is realized that a
declaration of will is meaningful only when introduced as a
part of the process of communication, and that the presump-
tion is, and it has always been, relevant under the civil law.75
In this fashion, the two component parts of the whole are
duly taken into account without destroying the unity they
present in reality, an old dispute is ended, and a very important
interest, reliance, is recognized. 76
It is submitted that sufficient authority to support this
approach can be found in the Louisiana Civil Code. As already
pointed out, since consent is a mere operation of the mind, it
will be of no effect, unless it is evidenced in some manner that
shall cause it to be understood by the other parties to the
75. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1894 (1870): "An agreement is not the less valid,
though the cause be not expressed," equivalent to art. 1132 of the FRENCH
CIVIL CODE (1804). See, in this connection, 3 ToULLIR, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS
SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 329 (1833): "It is upon him who wishes to make
the contract depend upon the reality of an unknown motive to so explain
himself and to make it a condition of his obligation; it is upon him who
makes a promise to investigate and to foresee beforehand what may follow
and what may result against his interests. If he wishes to break his contract
under the pretext of the falsity of the motive that the other party did not
know of, or had not regarded as a condition of the promise which he accept-
ed, he would lead the latter into an error the consequence of which he
should repair; he is obligated to make known an intention that the other
party cannot discover." Which means that, unless a different cause is mani-
fested by the party, a presumed cause will be deemed valid and sufficient.
See 1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS o DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 340 (1965).
76. Accord, Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52-96, 373-420 (1937). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932): "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 2 PuiG BRUTAU,
FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 257 (1954). See Choppin v. Labranche,
48 La. Ann. 1217, 1220, 20 So. 681, 682 (1896): "The principle of estoppel, so
often applied, in controversies involving pecuniary rights, will not permit
the withdrawal of promises or engagements on which another has acted."
See also Pue BRuTAU, ESTUDI0S DE DERECHO COMPARADO 124-25 (1951).
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contract." On the other hand, the party proposing is bound by
his proposition, and his later withdrawal will be of no avail,
if the other party's assent is given within the time the situation
of the parties and the nature of the contract shall prove that
it was the intention of the proposer to allow.78 As a consequence,
the party proposing may revoke his offer or proposition, but
not without allowing a reasonable time given from the terms
of his offer, or from the circumstances he may be supposed to
have intended to give to the other party to communicate his
determination.79 A promise will create no obligation for lack of
serious intent, unless the lack of serious intent is shown by the
manner in which the promise is made.8 0 No contract may be
invalidated because of error in motive, unless the other party
was apprised that the mistaken element was the principal cause
of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the transaction
it must be presumed that the other party knew.8 ' The obligation
arising out of a contract extends not only to what is expressly
stipulated, but also to everything that by law, equity, or custom
is considered incidental to the particular contract, or necessary
to carry it into effect.8 2 This means that the parties may be
bound to more than they might have actually intended, as the
law, in many instances, will substitute its determination for
their real intention.83 The intent of the parties is to be deter-
mined by the words of the contract, when these are clear and
explicit and lead to no absurd consequences.8 4 Certainly, the
literal sense of the words is not binding if there is anything
doubtful in the agreements;85 if that is the case, the common
intention of the parties should be ascertained."6 However, when
a clause is susceptible of two interpretations, it must be under-
stood in a sense in which it may have some effect, rather than
in a sense which would render it nugatory;8 a presumption of
the intention to become bound will prevail over a presumption
that the parties did not intend to bind themselves. When the
77. LA. CFnr CODS art. 1797 (1870). See Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann.
505, 17 So. 153, 28 L.R.A. 255 (1895).
78. Id. art. 1802.
79. Id. art. 1809.
80. Id. art. 1815.
81. Id. art. 1826.
82. Id. art. 1903. See also id. art. 1901, in fine.
83. Accord, 2 PUIG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 197-98
(1954).
84. LA. Cxrm CODE art. 1945(3) (1870).
85. Id. art. 1950.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 1951.
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
intent of the parties is doubtful, the manner in which it was
carried out by both parties, or by one of them with the express
or implied assent of the other, will furnish a rule for its inter-
pretation.88 The agreement, in a doubtful case, is interpreted
against the one who has contracted the obligation.89 Finally,
if a doubt or obscurity arises out of the want of necessary
explanation which one of the parties ought to have given, or
from any other negligence or fault of his, the construction most
favorable to the other party shall be adopted, whether he be
obligor or obligee.9
Many of the rules indicating how the intention is to be
expressed and interpreted have no equivalent in the French
Civil Code.91 When all those provisions are taken in the unity
of their context, the conclusion flows that the Louisiana Civil
Code contemplates the intention and its expression as a whole,
the parts of which support each other reciprocally. 2 The inten-
tion is to be sought in the words by which it is conveyed, and
where there is a difference giving rise to obscurity or ambiguity,
88. Id. art. 1956 (1870): "When the intent of the parties is doubtful, the
construction put upon it, by the manner in which it has been executed by
both, or by one with the express or implied assent of the other, furnishes
a rule for its interpretation." It is submitted that the word executed written
into the article is ambiguous, as it might mean signing of the contract or
performance of the same. The French text of the same article reads:
"Loraque Fintention des parties est douteuse, clest aues4 une r~gZe d'inter-
pretation que d'expliquer cette intention par la manicre dont Ie contrat a
dtd exdcutd par lea deux parties ou par Z'une d'entre elles, avec le consente-
ment expr~s ou implicite de Zautre." See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET
OF THE CIVm CODE OF 1825, 262 (1936). The reference of the French word
exdcut6 is more precise.
89. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1957 (1870). Although the text of this article is very
clear, after the amendment by La. Acts 1871, no. 87, it states exactly the
opposite of its French original text: "Dana Ie doute, la convention a'inter-
prete contre ceiuw qui a stipuld, enfaveur de celut qgut a contractd Z'obliga-
tion." See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1162 (1804). See Robbert v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc., 217 La. 325, 46 So.2d 286 (1950); Reed v. Fidelity & Guar. Fire
Corp., 17 La. App. 567, 136 So. 757 (1931); Schexnayder v. Capital Riverside
Acres, 170 La. 714, 129 So. 139 (1930). But see Pratt v. Centennial Realty Co.,
12' Orl. App. 76, 80 (La. App. 1914): "In case of doubt the conclusion must be
'in favorem solutionis,' in the sense the least onerous to the obligor."
90. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1958 (1870).
91. Such as id. arts. 1797, 1802, 1809, 1815, 1826, 1945, 1956, 1958. None are
equivalents to id arts. 1963-1967 found in the CODE NAPOLEON.
92. "The rights of parties to a contract are to be governed by the in-
tention of the parties, as reflected by the terms of the contract, subject only
to the law that controls the subject matter of the contract." Robinson v.
Horton, 197 La. 919, 2 So.2d 647 (1941). Accord, Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511,
50 So.2d 15 (1951); Vaughn v. P. J. McInernet & Co., 12 So.2d 516 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1943); Bank of Napoleonville v. Knobloch & Rainold, 144 La. 100,
106, 80 So. 214, 216 (1918): "When persons commit their agreements to writ-
ing, their intentions cannot be sought outside the four corners of the written
Instrument."
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the construction will be against the party who, through his
negligence or fault, originated them.
It can be said that the above-stated provisions give no
weight at all to a consideration of the common intent of the
parties as a mythical substance, but as an element resulting
from a process of communication, to be reasonably ascertained
by the courts.93
H. OFFER
Duration of the Offer: The Problem of Revocation
Historical Development
When the offer is accepted, the contract is complete. The
acceptance must be expressed to the one who made the offer;
it must conform to the terms of the proposition; 94 and, very
especially, the acceptance must take place before the offer is
terminated or revoked.9 5
The problem to be considered now is whether an offer
can be revoked at any time before it is accepted or whether
the offeror is bound by the terms of his offer, and, if this is
the case, within what limitations. These are problems that, in
everyday life, will be usually involved in cases of contracts by
correspondence. The delicate point is whether the offer can
be revoked after the acceptance takes place, but before it reaches
the offeror. The mere fact that the parties are not negotiating
face to face plainly excuses the occurrence of situations of this
sort. The two above-stated problems present a marked similarity
in nature; however, for better clarification they are taken apart
and analyzed separately. May he who offered revoke after the
acceptance, but before its reception, irrespective of the accep-
tance by the offeree? May the offeror be bound not to revoke
during a certain period in order to allow the offeree time for
a considered decision? 96
Here, the subject of discussion will be the duration of the
offer in the stricter sense.
In Roman law, an offer did not have a binding effect. Only
93. Accord, 2 PuiG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CvitL, PART I 200
(1954).
94. LA. Cwv CoDE art. 1805 (1870).
95. Id. art. 1800.
96. 2 Puio BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHo CIVIL, PART I 200 (1954).
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rarely could a unilateral promise of a public or religious nature
be enforced, as a promise of a gift made to a city.Y The regu-
larity of business correspondence was not very developed, as the
territorial expansion of trade took place mostly through agents
or personal representatives."
It was not until after the use of the mail became common
that the traditional rule of Roman origin was felt unsatisfactory.
The first reaction took place in the eighteenth century, when
the Prussian Code introduced a provision according to which
an offer remained firm for a certain period of timeY9 This rule
was not very clearly formulated, and it was not in force in all
the country, but only in certain sections. In the following
century, the German Commercial Code of 1861 adopted the
irrevocability rule in regard to commercial transactions, and,
with the advent of the German Civil Code, at the beginning
of the present century, the irrevocability rule became general
for Germany, irrespective of the type of transaction. Thus, he
who makes an offer to enter into a contract is bound by the
offer, unless he clearly signifies to the other party that he should
not be considered bound.100 The offer ceases to be binding when
it is declined by the offeree, or when it is not timely accepted. 10'
An offer made to a person who is present may be accepted
only there and then; the same rule applies in the case of an
offer made by telephone. When the offeree is not present, he
may accept the offer within such a period of time as the offeror
may expect the answer to take under ordinary circumstances.
0 2
If a period of time is named for acceptance, the latter may
take place only within that period.'0 3 When the arrival of the
acceptance is untimely, although transmitted in a manner to
make its reception timely with ordinary forwarding, the offeror,
if cognizant of the fact, must, upon reception of the acceptance,
notify the acceptor immediately of the delay, otherwise the
acceptance is deemed not to be untimely.10 4
97. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK oF ROMAN LAW 457 (1932); BUCKLAND & MO-
NAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 273 (2d ed. Lawson 1952).
98. Nussbaum, The Offer-And-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLUM. L. REv.
923 (1936).
99. Id.
100. B.G.B. art. 145.
101. B.G.B. art. 146.
102. B.G.B. art. 147.
103. B.G.B. art. 148.
104. B.G.B. art. 149. Provisions closely similar to those in arts. 145-149 of
the GERMAN CIvIL CODE are to be found in the Swiss CODE of 1907, and the
JAPANESE CODE of 1898.
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It is commonly asserted that in the Latin countries, the
Roman rule of revocability of the offer at any time before
acceptance prevails.10 5 However, the Italian Commercial Code
of 1882 provided that the offeror who exercised his power of
revocation was liable for damages when the offeree, relying on
the offer, prepared for performance.10 6 The present Italian Civil
Code, enacted in 1942, provides that an offer may be revoked
as long as the contract is not perfected, but, when the offeree
starts performance of the contract in good faith before knowing
of the revocation, he may recover from the offeror the expenses
and losses occasioned by the commenced performance.1' 7 On the
other hand, when the offeror names a period of time during
which the offer will remain firm, revocation during that period
will be of no effect. Not even the offeror's death or incapacity
will deprive the offer of its binding effect during this time,
unless the nature of the transaction, or other special circum-
stances, indicate the contrary108
In France, according to classical theory, the offer, by itself,
does not have binding effect until it is accepted, and, therefore,
can be revoked any time before the acceptance takes place. 1 9
105. Accord, 2 PuIG BRUTAU, FUNDAMONTOS DH DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 213
(1954); Nussbaum, The Offer-And-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLUM. L. REv.
99 (193).
106. See Nussbaum, The Offer-And-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 CoLUM. L.
REV. 924 (1936). In such a case the offeree would be entitled to recover costs
of packing, storage, freight, brokerage and so on, but not the full loss in-
flicted by the frustration of the contract. This rule rests on the culpa in
contrahendo theory, which differs from the principle underlying RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
107. ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 1328 (1942).
108. Id. art. 1329. It is of interest to notice that article 1333 of the same
code regulates a type of contract that bears a certain resemblance with the
typical common law unilateral contract. See 2 PUIG BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS
DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 214 (1954); Nussbaum, The Offer-And-Acceptance
Doctrine, 36 COLUM. L. Rgv. 924 (1936). According to this provision, an offer
is irrevocable when the proposed contract is one that only gives rise to an
obligation on the part of the proposer; the offeree may reject the offer
within such period as required by usages or the nature of the contract.
In default of rejection, the contract will be considered completed. See 1
STOLFI & STOLFI, IL Nuovo CODICE CIVILE COMMENTATO 150 (1949). See also
Pascal, DHration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv. 191, n. 51 (1939).
109. 1 AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-ORLIGATIONS (AN
ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 306 (1965);
2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CrvIL 336 (1957); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELUMENTAIRE
DE Dsorr CIVIL FRANQAIS 34 (10th ed. 1953); 2 JULuoT DR LA MORANDIERE, PRECIS
DR Diorr Civu, 161 (1957); 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 981, at 556 (1959);
1 POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS 5 (Evans
transl. 1806); 3 TOULLIER, LR DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE
323 (1833); 3 ZACHARIAE, LE DRorr CvivL FRANgAIS 553 (Mass6 & Verge, transl.
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This basic rule has been rationalized by asserting that, as there
can be no obligation without one person holding a right against
another who is obligated, no one can, by his sole promise, grant
a right to another, until their minds meet to acquire it, which
takes place only when the promise is accepted.110
Another consequence of the classic approach is that the
death of the offeror, or his supervenient incapacity, prior to the
acceptance terminates the offer.' It has been said that Article
932 of the Code Napoleon reflects this doctrine, when stating
that a donation inter vivos binds the donor only from the day
of the acceptance, adding that the latter should be made during
the lifetime of the donor."12
Modern French Law
But modern doctrine has voiced criticism of the classic
approach, and French jurprudence has tempered considerably
its effects. In the first place, from the moment the offer is
accepted, the offeror is considered bound by the tenor of his
proposition, without being allowed to allege that it does not
correspond to his real intent, unless there is evident error of
expression or transmission. 13 In the second place, in the case
of offers made to the public, the offeror cannot disengage himself
by asserting any reasons related to the character or nature of
the person who accepted his offer.114 In the third place, French
jurisprudence has admitted that, when a period of time for
acceptance is named in the offer, the offeror is bound not to
revoke during said period.115 Moreover, when no period of time
has been expressly named, French courts have considered the
offeror bound during a delay necessary for the answer to arrive,
1857). But see 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITL PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 143 (2d ed. Esmein 1952): "En ralson du caractere obNt-
gatotre qut et reconnu a 1'offre.... "
110. See 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRE Dm DRoT CIVIL FRANgAIS
45, no 2 (10th ed. 1958); 1 POTHMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR
CONTRACTS 5 (Evans transl. 1806); 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT
L'ORDRE OU CODE 323 (1833).
111. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELUMENTAIRM DR DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS
45, no 2 (1oth ed. 1953); 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SuIVANT L'ORDR
Du CODE 326 (1833). See D.P. 92, 1, 181., S. 95, 1, 398.
112. See 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS EL.MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
34 (10th ed. 1953); 3 TOULLIER, Ls DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRR DU
CODE 325 (1833).
113. See 2 JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, PRECIS DR DROIT CIVIL 162 (1957).
114. Thus, a statute passed on February 5, 1941, provides that a land-
lord cannot refuse to let premises to a person who is head of family with
children. See 4&
115. Bordeaux, Jan. 29, 1892, D. 92, 3, 390.
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whether by letter or telegram, according to the circumstances
of each case and prevailing conventional usages.116
Several theories have been advanced to justify the practical
ways of tempering the effects of the classical doctrine. One of
these theories attributes binding effects to the unilateral declara-
tion of will. The will alone, according to the supporters of this
view, suffices to give rise to an obligation, and, therefore, the will
should be incorporated in the traditional list of the sources of
obligations. Although this theory has been proposed in general
terms covering not only the field of contract, but also other
branches of the law, it cannot be denied that the case of the
offer and its controversial binding effects constitutes, perhaps,
the most relevant example constantly insisted upon by those
who adhere to this particular theory.""
But French jurisprudence seems to prefer either the theory
of abuse of right-abus de droit-or the preliminary contract
theory. According to the first, the offeror, when withdrawing
his offer, may incur a certain responsibility of a quasi-delictual
nature that entitles the offeree to recover damages for the
detriment he suffers when, through reliance on the offer, he
makes preparation to perform. It should be noticed that this
theory does not dispute the offeror's right to revoke his proposi-
tion before it has been accepted; but, under certain circumstances,
the exercising of his right does not constitute a reasonable "use,"
but an "abuse," for which he renders himself liable."l 8 This
approach has been criticized for attempting to substitute one
question for another. The main question, the critics say, is
whether or not the offeror has the right to revoke the offer
before the expiration of the time allowed or before the lapse
116. Lyon, Dec. 19, 1917, S. 1918, 2, 40; Paris, March 13, 1917, GAZ. PAL.
1916-1917.978; Civ. Feb. 6, 1906, S. 1906, 1, 235; Cass, Feb. 28, 1870, D. 71, 1,
61, S. 70, 1, 296; Lyon, June 27, 1867, S. 68, 2, 182, D. 67, 2, 194.
117. See 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN9AIS
36 (10th ed. 1953); 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 983, at 567-68 (1959);
6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITa PRATIQUE Dn DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OSLIGATIONS--
PART I 152 (2d. Esmein 1952).
118. See 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS
35 (10th ed. 1953); 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 983, at 567-68 (1959);
6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITh PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS--
PART I 152 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). This theory is based on art. 1382 of the
CODE NAPOLEON, similar to IA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870). See generally 1
MAZEAUD & TUNC, TRAITf THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT19 CIVILE




of a reasonable period of time. If he has such a right, no liability
can be incurred by exercising it under normal conditions. On
the other hand, if the damages that the other party may recover
amount to all the profit expected from the contract, it would
be the same as saying, in effect, that the offer cannot be validly
revoked. If the latter is a valid assertion, say the critics, then the
abuse of right theory cannot stand because it starts from the
opposite premise.""
According to the preliminary contract theory, a simple offer
already contains the foundations of a contractual obligation on
the part of the proposer. When the offer is made with a specified
time for acceptance, two offers, in reality, are issued at the same
time: (a) the proposition to enter into a contract, which requires
the acceptance of the offeree to attain a contractual status, and
(b) the offer to have the offeror bound during the named period
of time. This secondary or accessory offer is of such a nature
that it warrants the presumption of its being accepted by the
offeree from the time it comes to his knowledge, as it is all to
his advantage. From that moment, therefore, a preliminary con-
tract is formed between the parties, whereby the offeror binds
himself not to revoke the offer before the expiration of the
time allowed for acceptance. If, eventually, the offeree accepts
within the allowed period of time, the principal contract will
be formed, and the creditor will be entitled to demand its
performance. 120 Consequently, according to this approach, the
one who makes the offer can withdraw it as long as it has not
come to the knowledge of the offeree. The offeror, for instance,
would be able to revoke by telegram, a proposition made by
letter, but only before the addressee has received the offer.
12 1
The preliminary contract theory is considered artificial and
unrealistic by a vast portion of contemporary French doctrine.
122
119. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 341 (1957); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS
1LMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANcQAIS 35 (10th ed. 1953); 1 DEMOGUE, TRAiT9
DES OBLIGATIONS EN QtNtRAL 187-88 (1923).
120. 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 341 (1957); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS
ELAMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 35-36 (10th ed. 1953); 2 JULLIOT DE LA
MORANDIERE, PRECIS DE DROIT CIVIL 163 (1957); 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE,
PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no.
983, at 567 (1959); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 151 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
121. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITO PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBUIGA-
TIONS-PART I 155 n.3 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
122. 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 341 (1957); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURE
EIUMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 36 (10th ed. 1953); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT,
TRAITf PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 152 (2d ed.
Esmein 1952).
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The writers who criticize the theory, in spite of its support
by the jurisprudence, prefer to explain the obligation of the
offeror as a binding effect of his unilateral declaration of will.
This approach, according to its supporters, is theoretically more
consistent, and, as it is asserted, several instances of its applica-
tion can be found in the French Civil Code.1 2
But the important thing is that, irrespective of the under-
lying theory adopted as a justification, French doctrine and
French jurisprudence agree on the conclusion that an offer
has to be maintained by the offeror during a certain period of
time.1 24 The three following situations have been carefully dis-
tinguished:
(1) Where the offeror has named, in a precise manner, the
period of time during which he is to be bound by the offer.
In that case, he must maintain the proposition until the expira-
tion of the delay, unless he is disengaged at an earlier time
by the offeree's refusal. But, in default of acceptance within the
named period, the offer terminates. In case of doubt, it should
be understood that the acceptance was supposed to arrive, and
not only be transmitted, within the allowed delay. 25
(2) Where the offeror has not named a fixed period for
acceptance, but has requested an immediate answer. In such a
situation the offer must be maintained during the period of time
necessary for the offer and the answer to arrive at their destina-
tions, under normal circumstances, whether by messenger, tele-
123. Accord, 1 BAJDRY-LACANTINERIE & BARDE, TRAMI THtORIQUE ET PRA-
TIQUE DE Deorr CIVIL 33 (2d ed. 1900); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELPMENTAIRE
DE DRorr CIVIL FRANcAIS 36 (10th ed. 1953); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1373, similar
to L.A. CIVIL CODE art. 2297 (1870), imposing on the one who undertakes the
management of another's affairs the obligation to continue with the manage-
ment. See also FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 2184 and 873, similar to LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1433 (1870) according to which the heir who accepts the estate
obligates himself to pay the debts of the same.
124. See, e.g., TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE RJ§FORME DU CODE CIVIL 705
(1950): "Art. 11. The offeror may revoke his offer if it has not yet been
accepted. However, when the offer sets a period for acceptance or such
a period results from the circumstances of the case, the offer cannot be
revoked before this period has expired, except in the case where the offer
has not yet come to the attention of the offeree." Accord, VON MEHREN,
THE CIVIL LAw SYSTEM 479 (1957).
125. Colmar, Feb. 4, 1936, D.H. 1936, 187; Civ. Feb. 2, 1932, Sir., 1932, 1,
68; Lyon, Dec. 19, 1917, Sir., 1918-1919, 2, 40; Civ. Feb. 6, 1906, D. 1910, 1,
234, S. 1906, 1, 235; 1 AuBRY & RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
rIONS (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 306
(1965); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITfa PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS--OBIOA-
nONS-PART I 155 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
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graph, or mail, plus a certain delay for consideration. This
additional delay may vary according to the circumstances.12 6
(3) Where the offeror has not named a delay. Then, in the
case of a verbal offer when the parties are face to face, it is
possible that immediate acceptance is the only one contemplated
by the offeror. But this is not always so, and, actually, the
question is one of fact to be decided in each case according to
its circumstances. Contracts by telephone should be included
in this category.12
Since making an offer implies the obligation of maintaining
it for a certain period of time, its revocation before that period
has expired renders the offeror liable by having revoked, with-
out the necessity of the offeree establishing the offeror's fault,
but subject to the latter's right to prove the absence of any
fault.12
But the question has been raised as to whether the revoca-
tion of an offer that ought to be maintained should be considered
as ineffectual, and the contract concluded by timely acceptance
as if the concurrence of the parties' wills had taken place.
A negative answer has been given to this question by
French doctrine.129 Here, it has been said, the accord of the
parties' wills is wanting, and, therefore, no contract can be
considered as existent because of the lack of its essential ele-
ment. It is granted that when this situation arises between
parties who are not face to face, the accord of their wills cannot
take place at one and the same moment, as strict theory seems
to demand. 130 However, if the doctrine which considers the
contract concluded in spite of the revocation of the offer is
accepted, it should also be accepted that the party who with-
draws the offer may, notwithstanding, invoke the formation of
the contract. In the case of contracts effecting a displacement
126. Accord, 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 156 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); Bordeaux, Jan. 17, 1870, S. 70,
2, 219, D. 71, 2, 96; Lyon, June 27, 1867, S. 68, 2182, D. 67, 2, 194.
127. Accord, 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITIb PRATIQUE DE Deorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 156 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); Paris, Dec. 3, 1959, J.C.P. 60 IV,
ed. G., 80; Beauvais, Feb. 3, 1925, GAZ. PAL., 1925, 1, 705; Lyon, Dec. 19, 1917,
S. 1918, 2, 40; Paris, Feb. 5, 1910, D. 1913, 2, 1.
128. 2 DEMOGUE, TRArrh DES OBLIGATIONS EN GfONtRAL 183-90 (1923); 6
PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DS DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-
PART I 153 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); Req. Jan. 28, 1924, D.H. 1924, 121.
129. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 153 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
130. See . at 141-43.
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of the risk of a thing from one party to the other upon consent
alone, such a conclusion would allow one of the contracting
parties, in spite of his revocation, to charge the other who
accepted with the loss of the thing. Obviously, it is said, such
a consequence is opposed to good faith.' 8 1
According to French doctrine, the court may, in such a
situation, declare the contract concluded between the parties,
but only at the request of the one who accepted, and as a matter
of recovery of damages. The one who made the offer will be
adjudged to enter the contract, or stand judgment for damages
in its default. But the court is not bound to decide in this way,
precisely because the contract is declared concluded only as
a means of making reparation.1 Such a decision will be reached
only when the detriment sustained by the accepting party is
important enough to warrant the remedy. It might well be
that the offeror's failure to conclude the contract does not
cause any injury, for example, if the offeree did not prepare
to perform, in which case there is no need to deem the contract
concluded.183
Common Law
At common law, careful distinctions must be made in the
methods by which the duration of an offer is determined. The
131. Id. at 153.
132. See 1 MAZEAUD & TUNC, TRAITP TH.1ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPON-
siBILITI CIVIL DtLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 151 (1957).
133. Although with some exceptions, when the liability arising out of
the revocation of an offer is grounded on a delictual theory-abus de droit-
French courts have awarded the offeree damages amounting to his expenses
and losses In preparing for performance. See Rennes, July 8, 1929, D.H. 1929-
548. See AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE Dsorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIATIONS (AN ENG-
LISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 306 (1965); 2
DEMOGUE, TRArrb DES OBLIGATIONS SN GANIRAL 186 (1923). But when the grounds
for decision is the preliminary contract theory or precontractual liability,
according to the approach of Saleilles, Responsablitd Prdcontratuelle, REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE 733 (1907), French courts will go as far as awarding the full
benefit expected from the contract. This second solution seems to be the
one prevailing in the modern doctrine and jurisprudence. See 2 DEMOGUS,
id. at 187; 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITf9 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 153-54 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). Accord, Toulouse, Jan. 18,
1912, GAZ. PAL. 1912, I, 215; Paris, Feb. 5, 1910, GAz. TRIB., March 1, 1910. It
cannot be denied that this solution is identical with the results obtainable
through application of the promissory estoppel doctrine of RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). However, in a rather recent decision, the court of
Pontoise returned to the restrictive approach. See Pontoise, April 17, 1960,
D. 1961, som. 2. For a treatment of this problem in Swiss law, see PIOTET,
CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO 13-23 (1963).
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offeror is the principal control.8 4 He creates the power 3 5 of
acceptance in the offeree, and he determines the operation of
that power. The offeree has limited freedom with regard to the
negotiations, and each of his actions has a definite effect on the
duration of the offer. Finally, the law draws certain conclu-
sions from factual situations, and prescribes certain legal con-
sequences.
In general terms, the offeror may revoke his offer at any
time before the offeree accepts the offer.'R8 Unless he is other-
wise bound,13 his power to revoke is not limited by any state-
134. "At the time that he makes his offer, the offeror has full control
of its terms, of the person who shall have power to accept, of the mode of
acceptance, and of the length of time during which the power of acceptance
shall last." 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 35, at 105 (1950). "As the offeror is at
liberty to make no offer at all he is also at liberty to dictate whatever
terms he sees fit if he chooses to make an offer." WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 53,
at 59 (Student ed. 1938).
135. 1 CORBIN, CONTACrS § 35 (1950). This terminology had its genesis
in Hohfeld, Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE LJ. 16 (1913). The correlative relationships espoused by Hohfeld have
been very successful as a standard applied by common law courts.
136. ANSON, CONTRACTS 54, 55 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 38 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 55 (Student ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 41 (1932); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 50a (1963); 17 AM. JuR. Con-
tracts § 36, 35 (1964): "The right, before acceptance, to revoke an ordinary
offer, or an offer not supported by consideration, is unquestioned." 8 HALS-
BURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Contracts 125 (3d ed. 1954). See, e.g., Burnes v. Euster,
240 Md. 603, 214 A.2d 807, 810 (1965): ("It is hornbook law that an offer of
no specified duration must be accepted within a time reasonable under the
circumstances or the offer will lapse and a subsequent attempt to accept
will be of no effect."); Halstead v. Globe Hoist Co., 231 F. Supp. 1012 (1964);
State v. Hall, 6 Wash. 2d 531, 108 P.2d 339 (1940); Rucker v. Sanders, 182
N.C. 607, 109 S.E. 851 (1921).
This problem is strongly connected, in common law, with the doctrine
of consideration. It is the lack of consideration that makes the unsupported
promise unenforceable. See generally Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause,
12 LA. LAw REv. 31-34 (1951). A detailed discussion of this topic belongs else-
where.
137. ANSON, CONTRACTS 56, 57 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§§ 42-46, 48 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 61 (Student ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS §§ 35, 45, 46, 47 (1932); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 50b (1963); 17 AM.JUR.
Contracts §§ 32, 35, 36 (1964).
The primary cause is contractual in nature, the option. See, e.g., Cooper
v. Kensil, 31 N.J. Super. 87, 106 A.2d 27 (1954); Sargent & Co. v. Heggen, 195
Iowa 361, 190 N.W. 506 (1922): "An option is a continuing offer which the
offeror may not withdraw until the expiration of the time fixed." Rath v.
Moeller, 104 C.A. 72, 197 P. 62 (1921). The theory of promissory estoppel also
appears. See, e.g., Drennon v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757
(1962): "Reasonable reliance resulting in foreseeable prejudicial change in
position affords a compelling basis for implying a subsidiary promise not
to revoke an offer for a bilateral contract"; American Handkerchief Corp.
v. Frannot Realty Co., 17 N.J. 12, 109 A.2d 793 (1954). See also RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). See generally Wally v. Trinity Sand & Gravel Co., 369
S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1963).
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ment that he might make.'u Whether he expressly or impliedly
promises not to revoke the offer for a certain period of time, or
promises to limit his freedom to revoke his offer in some other
way,'1 89 or promises to let the offeree have a certain period
within which to accept, he is free to revoke the offer. This
revocation must be communicated in order to be effective.1 40
However, the offeror's statements of duration do have an
effect on the offeree's power. When the offeror states that the
offer will remain open for a certain period of time, or that it
may be accepted within a certain period of time, the offeree
must exercise his power within that period.141 Unless he so
does, his power to accept will terminate. If the offeror states
that he requires an immediate response, the offeree is required
to respond with reasonable immediacy.142 When no period of
time for acceptance is stated by the offeror, the law implies
that the offer will remain open for a reasonable period of time,
after which it will lapse. 143 What is a reasonable period of time,
138. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 38 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 61 (Student
ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 50a (1963); 17 AM. JUR., Contracts § 36 (1964);
8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Contracts § 125 (3d ed. 1954). See, e.g., Sakol
v. Hill, 310 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. App. 1958); Johnson v. Fitzke, 234 Minn. 216, 48
N.W.2d 37 (1951); Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 14
Ohio Ops. 399, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939); Womack v. Dalton Adding Mach. Co.,
285 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Night Commander Lighting Co. v. Brown,
213 Mich. 214, 181 N.W. 979 (1921); Krohn-Fecheimer Co. v. Palmer, 282 Mo.
82, 221 S.W. 353 (1920).
139. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 47 (1950). Earnest money and forfeiture of
down payment are examples of such limitations.
140. ANSON, CONTRACTS 59 (21st ed. Guest 1959); CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 39-42
(1950); GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 32, 33 (Murray, 1965); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
HI 56, 60AA (Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 50d (1963); 8 HALSBURY,
LAWS OF ENGLAND Contracts § 125 (3d ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 41, 42 (1932). Larson v. Superior Auto Parts, Inc., 81 N.W.2d 505 (Wis.
1962); Potter v. McCauley, 196 F.Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1961); U. S. v. Sabin
Metal Corp., 151 F.Supp. 683 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1958).
141. ANSON, CONTRACTS 54 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 35
(1950) ;WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 53 (Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 58
(1963); 17 AM. JUR. Contracts § 42 (1964); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND
Contracts § 124 (3d ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 40 (1932). See gen-
erally Midland Properties Co. v. Union Properties, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 150(N.D. Ohio 1957); Bridge v. O'Callahan, 118 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1953); Master
Laboratories v. Chesnut, 157 Neb. 317, 59 N.W.2d 571 (1953); Trotter v.
Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329 (1946); Wax v. Northwest Seed Co., 189 Wash.
212, 64 P.2d 513 (1937).
142. Van Camp Packing Co. v. Smith, 101 Md. 565, 61 A. 284 (1905). See
also Union Central Life Ins. Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio v. Burgess, 131 Neb. 20,
266 N.W. 898 (1936), in which the court relied on the reasonableness of the
offeree's interpretation of the term "immediately" on the theory that the
use of the word places a reasonable interpretation of the word within the
framework of the contract.
For an examination of "at once" see 17 AM Jur. Contracts § 56 (1964).
143. ANSON, CONTRACTS 55 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 35,
36 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 54 (Student ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 40 (1932); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 51b (1963); 17 AM. JUR. Contracts § 56
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under given circumstances, is a factual determination made
from the objective standpoint of what the offeree was reasonably
led to believe from the circumstances of the offer, and the nature
of the contract contemplated.'4 As a general rule, a reasonable
period of time is as long as it takes to respond to the offer
through the same means used to communicate it or the means
that the offeror directed to be used.145
A distinction must be drawn among revocation, termination,
and lapse of the power of acceptance. The first is the result
of an act of the offeror after the creation of the power, of which
the offeree has no prior notice. The second is the result of an
act of the offeror, at the time of the creation of the power of
acceptance, of which the offeree has notice. The third is a result
of the operation of the law.
The offeree may reject the offer,'1 46 in terms either express,
as in the case of a direct rejection, or implied, as in the case of a
counter offer.147 However, the offeree can avoid the effects of a
(1964); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Contracts § 124 (3d ed. 1954). State
ex rel. Philips v. Hall, 6 Wash.2d 531, 108 P.2d 339 (1940): "An unaccepted
offer terminates, by lapse of time, at the expiration of the time limited for
its acceptance, or, if no time is fixed in the offer, at the expiration of a
reasonable time." See also Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co.,
204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931); Oliver v. Wells, 243 N.Y.S. 328, aff'd, 254
N.Y. 451, 173 N.E. 676 (1930); Bogart v. George K. Porter Co., 193 Cal. 197,
223 P. 959 (1924). The same is true of a counter offer, Murray v. Lititz Mut.
Ins. Co., 5 Terry 447, 61 A.2d (Del. 1948).
144. ANSON, CONTRACTS 55 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 35,
at 109 (1950): "This is the time that a reasonable man in the exact position
of the offeree would believe satisfactory to the offeror." WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 54 (Student ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 40 (1932); 17 C.J.S. Con-
tracts § 51b (1963); 17 AM. JuR. Contracts § 31 (1964). Coleman v. Davies,
39 Wash.2d 312, 235 P.2d 199 (1951); Coats & Williamson v. Moran & Co., 67
Cal. App. 46, 227 P. 213 (Cal. 1924).
145. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 36 (1950) reflects such a standard. RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS §§ 40(3) and 51 (1932) are reflective of such a standard as
Is the jurisprudence with regard to contracts of correspondence, which will
be considered at another place. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 5Ob (1963). Williston
suggests no standards in this area other than the vague reasonable man test.
146. ANSON, CONTRACTS 51, 62 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 94 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 50, 51 (Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Con-
tracts § 51a (1963); 17 AM. JuR. Contracts § 39 (1964); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND Contracts §§ 129, 132 (3d ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35,
37 (1932). Nabob Oil Co. v. Bay State Oil & Gas Co., 208 Okla. 296, 255 P.2d
513 (1953); Cook v. Story, 89 Wash. 109, 154 P. 147 (1916); Minneapolis &
St. L. R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149 (1886); Hyde v.
Wrench, 3 Beau. 334, 49 Eng. Rep. 132 (1840).
147. ANSON, CONTRACTS 51, 62 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 94 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 50, 51 (Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Con-
tracts § 51a (1963); 17 AM. JUR. Contracts § 39 (1964); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND Contracts § 132 (3d ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35, 37
(1932); Schiff v. Schiff, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 626, 45 N.E.2d 132, rehearing denied,
48 N.E.2d 139 (1942); Wittwer v. Hurwitz, 216 N.Y. 259, 110 N.E. 433 (1915).
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tacit rejection by stating that his response is not to be taken
as a refusal to contract and that he still holds the offer under
advisement.1 4s
Other factors will also extinguish the offeree's power of
acceptance by operation of the law. Thus, if either party dies 49
or becomes incapable' 50 of contracting, the offer will be extin-
guished. Also, the supervening death of a person or destruction
of a thing essential to the contract will end' 51 the power of
acceptance and the same will occur if the contract or its object
is pronounced illegal by competent authority. 52
Louisiana Law
Louisiana Civil Code
In French law, as it was shown, the solutions to the problem
presented by the revocability of the offer have been the creation
of the doctrine and the jurisprudence, as no detailed regulations
can be found in the Code Napoleon. In effect, those solutions
were presented as an elaboration on Article 1108 of the French
Civil Code, which enumerates the requirements for a valid
contract, and, among them, consent.
In Louisiana, on the contrary, the Civil Code devotes a
series of articles to the detailed regulation of offer and accep-
tance. Those provisions were not found in the Civil Code of
1808, which corresponded with the French model, but were first
proposed in the Projet of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, and
introduced into the Louisiana law with the Code enacted in that
year.153
14& ANSON, CONTRACTS 51, 62 (Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 90
(1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 51 (Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 51a
(1963); 17 AM. JUR. Contracts § 40 (1964); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Con-
tracts § 129, 132 (3d ed. 1954); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35, 38 (1932). See,
e.g., Turner v. McCormick, 56 W. Va. 161, 49 S.E. 28 (1904).
149. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 92 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 51 (Student
ed. 1938); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND Contracts § 132 (3d ed. 1954). See
generally 17 AM. JUR. Contracts §§ 62-66 (1964).
150. ANSON, CONTRACTS 54 (21st ed. Guest 1959); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 54
(1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 50a, 62 (Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§ 51 (1963); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 48, 35 (1932); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND Contracts § 124 (3d ed. 1954).
151. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 54 (1950); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 50a, 62
(Student ed. 1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 51c (1963); 17 AM. JuR. Contracts
§ 38 (1964); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 35, 48, 54 (1932); 8 HALSBURY, LAWS
OF ENGLAND Contracts § 124 (3d ed. 1954).
152. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 50a (Student ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 35 (1932).
153. 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825 234-36




For reasons of clarity, the articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code having a direct bearing are quoted:
"Article 1800: The contract, consisting of a proposition
and the consent to it, the agreement is incomplete until
the acceptance of the person to whom it is proposed. If he,
who proposes, should before that consent is given, change
his intention on the subject, the concurrence of the two
wills is wanting, and there is no contract."'1
"Article 1801: The party proposing shall be presumed
to continue in the intention, which his proposal expressed,
if, on receiving the unqualified assent of him to whom the
proposition is made, he do not signify the change of his
intention."1 55
"Article 1802:, He is bound by his proposition, and the
signification of his dissent will be of no avail, if the pro-
position be made in terms, which evince a design to give
the other party the right of concluding the contract by his
assent; and if that assent be given within such time as the
situation of the parties and the nature of the contract shall
prove that it was the intention of the proposer to allow."' 156
"Article 1803: But when one party proposes, and the
other assents, then the obligation is complete, and by virtue
of the right each has impliedly given to the other, either
of them may call for the aid of the law to enforce it."' 157
"Article 1804: The acceptance needs not be made by
the same act, or in point of time, immediately after the
proposition; if made at any time before the person who offers
154. See 3 TOuusR, LE DROrr CIVIL FANgAIs SUIVANT L'OwIDS DU CODE 323
(1833). Accord, Pascal, Durat4on and Revocabi4ty of an Offer, 1 LA. L. Ruv.
184 n.17 (1939).
155. 3 TouLLiR, Lu DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORD DU CODE 325-26
(1833): "Accustomed to deal with you, I write to you offering to sell 100 vats
of wine at 600 francs, and I make clear that I will wait for your answer
before selling the wine to another. I cannot, then, revoke my offer before
the time necessary to receive your answer; but if It takes too long, I re-
cover my freedom that I had only engaged for a limited time." Although
LA. CIVrI CODE art. 1801 (1870) does not duplicate Toullier's words, it seems
to reflect the same Idea.
1 156. See id. § 31, at 326. But see Pascal, Duration and Revocability of
an Offer, 1 I. L. REv. 184 (1932).
157. See 3 TOULUIMR, Lu DEorr CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 323
(1833). Accord, Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv.
184 (1939).
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or promises has changed his mind, or may reasonably be
presumed to have done so, it is sufficient."'1x
"Article 1809: The obligation of a contract not being
complete, until the acceptance, or in cases where it is
implied by law, until the circumstances which raise such
implication, are known to the party proposing; he may
therefore revoke his offer or proposition before such accep-
tance, but not without allowing such reasonable time as from
the terms of his offer he has given, or from the circum-
stances of the case he may be supposed to have intended to
give to the party, to communicate his determination." 59
The meaning of Article 1800 is clear in the sense that the
contract is not complete until the acceptance takes place, and
that, if there is a change in the proposer's intention, there will
be no contract because of the lack of an accord of the wills-
the essential element. As expressed in traditional doctrine, a
man can always change his will, because of his natural freedom
provided the change does not injure the right of another.'6°
No account has to be given for such change of will.1 ' But a
question arises, then, as to whether the offer lasts indefinitely,
if the offeror does not change his mind. This question has been
traditionally answered in the negative, as the theory of the
indefinite duration of an offer was never applied.21 2 The offeree,
according to tradition, must give his answer promptly. He
cannot, long after a proposition has been made to him, declare
that he accepts it and demand performance, under pretext that
the offer was never revoked. In civilian theory, therefore, an
offer remains open until revoked, but, in the event of lack of
revocation, is not maintained forever.8 3
This invites a second question that should be raised in order
to arrive at the correct interpretation of Article 1800: whether
the offeror's change of intention must be expressed or whether
158. See 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 323
(1833). Accord, Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REV.
184 n.21 (1939).
159. See 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 325
(1833). Accord, Pascal, Duration and Revocabtity of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv.
184 n.23 (1939).
160. 3 ToULLUIE, LE DROr CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT LORDRE DU CODE 323
(1833).
161. Id.: "L'autre partie peut les retirer avant qu'eells soient acceptdes,
sans qu'on puisse lui demander compte de 8on changement de volontd."
162. See PARDESSUS, COUeS DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 141 (1942). Accord, Pascal,
Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv. 194 (1939).
163. PARDESSUS, COURS DE DR0IT COMMERCIAL 141 (1942).
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his mere change of mind without being expressed to the offeree
will suffice to prevent the formation of the contract. Apparently,
Article 1800 does not introduce the requirement that the pro-
poser shall express his change of intention.16 4 However, it is
submitted that the principle of Article 1797 of the Louisiana
Civil Code governs not only the case of expression of intention,
but the case of change of intention as well. As traditionally
asserted, an unknown will does not enter the field of the law-
une volontd qui n'est pas connue est, en jurisprudence, comme
si elle n'existait pas.165 A change of mind, therefore, is nothing
but the substitution of a new will for the previously expressed
one, and, as such, cannot be operative until expressed in its
turn; otherwise, legal effects would be given to something that,
because of its being unknown, remains outside the legal field.
But this should be understood with the following qualification:
the change of intention must be expressed, or in some manner
evidenced as long as the offer remains open or is deemed to
remain open. It is obviously unnecessary for the offeror to
express his change of intent when the offer is already terminated,
because in such a situation the offeree no longer has the right
of concluding the contract by his assent.160
However, there is a limitation to the proposer's freedom
to express his change of intention after the termination of the
offer. Under Article 1801 if the offeree gives his acceptance
when the offer can no longer be considered open, then the
offeror must signify that he has changed his intention, other-
wise he will be presumed to maintain his original proposal.1
67
As shown above, the law does not presume that an offer
remains indefinitely open. But, if the proposer does not express
a change of mind, he will be presumed not to have changed it at
least for a period of time. This is stated in the provisions of
Article 1802: If the offeree gives his assent "within such time as
the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract shall
prove that it was the intention of the proposer to allow," the
164. Pascal, Duration and Revooability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. Rv. 187
(1939).
165. 3 TOULLImR, LE DROIT CWVM FRANGgAS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 325
(1833).
166. Id. at 323. See LA. Crvm CODE arts. 1799 and 1802 (1870).
167. If the acceptance arrives after too long a period of time, whether
months or even years after the offer was made, according to the nature of
the contract, the offeror would be released of every duty of signifying his
dissent; Accord, Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REV.
183, 192 (1939).
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offeror's "signification of his dissent will be of no avail." In
other words, the acceptance given within this period is timely,
after its reception the offeror cannot allege that, before receiving
it, he had changed his mind. He may change his mind before
acceptance, provided he expresses this intention.'"
It is submitted that this is the right interpretation of Article
1801. If interpreted literally, the article might lead to the
conclusion that the offer may be revoked after it has been
accepted.169 But such a literal interpretation renders the article
inconsistent with Articles 1798, 1800, 1802, 1803 and 1809, and
establishes an unfair rule entirely opposed to the tenets of an
immemorial tradition.170
Therefore, Articles 1801 and 1802 are not properly concerned
with the maintainability of the offer during a certain period of
time, but with the expression of the offeror's dissent after a
certain period of time has elapsed. These rules have to be inter-
preted against the background of the traditional concepts accord-
ing to which a change of intent, although not expressed, elimi-
nates the accord of the wills and prevents the creation of the
contract.' 71 It is precisely the unrestrained operation of these
ideas that the articles were meant to temper, by introducing a
168. In German law, a traditional distinction Is made between declara-
tions of will that are empfangsbedfirfltg (the literal translation being "neces-
sitous of reception"-ayant beso4n d'etre regue, in French): see 1 ENNECCERUS-
NIPPERDyE, ALLGEMEINER TEiL, LEHRBUCH DES BUROERLICHEN RECHTS, PART II
611 (1949). See also 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 336 (1957), and those that are
not empfangsbeditrftig. It Is agreed, for instance, that an offer is an emfangs-
beditrftig act (I ENNECCERUS at 682) as it will not be considered complete
until received by the addressee. The revoctalon of the offer is also held an
empfangsbedfirfltg act in German law; see 1 ENNECCERUS at 680-81. The
consequence of this is that the revocation will be valid only when it reaches
the offeree before the offer itself.
But there is a different solution in French law, where the revocation
is deemed a declaration de volontd non rdceptice, borrowing the distinction
from German law. See 2 DEMOGUE, TRArr DES OBLIGATIONS EN GAN9RAL 184
(1923). Therefore, the revocation is valid when expressed before the accep-
tance reaches the offeror. See 2 DEMOGUE at 194: "The change of mind, once
expressed, becomes a known will, on its turn, to be concerned with." In
French law, therefore, although the revocation Is not dependent on its re-
ception for its validity, it has to be expressed, otherwise, if the change of
mind Is merely subjective, it would not be operative." The same considera-
tions are valid in Louisiana In order to properly interpret LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 1800 (1870).
169. See Boyd v. Cox, 15 La. Ann. 609 (1860).
170. For an admirable exegetical explanation of the connection between
these ideas and the German doctrine reflected In the PRUSSIAN CODE OF 1794
the knowledge of which Is attributed to the code revision committee ap-
pointed in 1822, see Pascal, Duration and Revocabiity of an Offer, 1 LA.
L. REv. 183, 193 (1939).
171. 3 TouLimR, Lz DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 323
(1833); 2 DEmoGuE, TRArit DES OBLIGATIONS EN GtNARAL 190 (1923).
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principle of fairness: the accord of the wills will be considered
accomplished upon the acceptance whenever the offeror does
not signify his dissent within a certain period of time.172
A question has been raised as to the meaning of the words
"the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract" in
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1802.178 It has been said that the
situation of the parties is an expression that should be inter-
preted as meaning that a distinction should be made according
to whether the parties are face to face, or at a distance. 174 This
distinction seems obvious and, in its light, the words in question
acquire a very clear meaning. However, these words do not
only contain a reference to the location of the parties in space,
but they can also mean something inherent to the parties' posi-
tion, or status, such as, whether the parties are merchants or not,
according to a distinction of long standing tradition in con-
tinental law.175
As to the expression the nature of the contract, it has been
suggested that the right interpretation lies in the distinction
between bilateral and unilateral contracts. 76 To arrive at this
conclusion, the possibility that the expression intended to mean
the seriousness of the contemplated contract was discarded as
"such an interpretation would evidently be contrary to the
policy of a system which regulates the time for transmission of
the acceptance, because it would introduce an element of uncer-
tainty in the duration of the period of irrevocability."'177 But,
if it is agreed that Article 1802 does not regulate a period of
irrevocability but is concerned with a different aspect, then there
is no bar to admitting that, if not the seriousness, at least the
importance of the contemplated contract might be one of the
elements to which the expression here discussed alludes. More-
over, the nature of the contract also seems to mean the special
kind of contract contemplated, according to the specific types
regulated in Title VI, Book III, of the Code. This interpretation
seems to find support in Louisiana Civil Code Article 1816. Thus,
172. See Pascal, Duration and Revocabitity of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv.
183, 192 (1939).
173. Id. at 190.
174. Id.
175. It is suggestive that the examples chosen by TOULLIER (Le DROIT
C1VM FRANAMS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 325 n.2 (1833) ) concern negotiations
between merchants.
176. Pascal, Duration and Revocabtlity of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv. 190
(1939).
177. Id.
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the position of the offeree may vary according to whether the
offer was one of a mandate to perform an urgent act or an offer
to sell when no special circumstances indicate that time is of
the essence.17 8
Article 1804 of the Louisiana Civil Code, in a manner con-
sistent with Articles 1801 and 1802, as interpreted above,
recognizes that offer and acceptance do not have to take place
by the same act nor at the same time.. The proposition and
the assent may be separated by a delay, but not by an indefinite
one, since after a certain period of time, the offeror may be
presumed to have changed his mind without having signified
it. 179 The words in the article "any time before the person who
offers or promises has changed his mind," must be interpreted
in the light of the offeror's duty to express his dissent, already
discussed in connection with Article 1801.
Articles 1805 through 1808 are not applicable here, for they
deal with the conformity of the acceptance to the offer. Article
1809 contains the provisions that actually deal with the prob-
lem of duration of the offer.
This article says, very clearly, that the one who proposes
cannot revoke the offer:
(1) When he has given the other party a period of time
to communicate his determination. In other words, if a period
of time for acceptance is named by the offeror, he cannot validly
revoke during this period.
(2) When no period of time is named by the offeror, before
such time as he is presumed to have given the other party to
make known his determination, according to the circumstances
of the case.Isc
178. See IA.. CnvL CODS art. 1933(1) (1870) for an example of distinctions
to be made according to whether time is of the essence of a contract.
179. See 2 DEMOUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GANARAL 194 (1923).
180. The French text of article 1809, as found in LA. CIVM CoDE art. 1803(1825), reads: ". . . elle peut, avant cette acceptation, rdvoquer son offre, aprds
avoir toutefoi8 laiss6 passer le tempa raisonable qu'elle peut avoir donnd a
autre partie, par lea termes de sa proposition, ou qu'elle est censde lui avoir
donnd, d'aprds les circonstances, pour faire connaltre sa d6termination."
In Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. Rsv. 188 (1939),
the following translation is proposed: "... he may therefore revoke his
offer or proposition before such acceptance, but not without having allowed
to pass the reasonable time which he may have given to the other party by
the terms of his proposition, or which he is presumed to have given him,
according to the circumstances of the case, for making known his determina-
tion." Certainly, the French expression qu'elle eat censde lui avoir donnd,
conveys a stronger meaning than the expression "he may be supposed to
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Due to the similarity of the language in Articles 1802 and
1809, it has been suggested that the words "the circumstances
of the case," in the latter mean the same as the words "the
situation of the parties and the nature of the contract," in the
former.181 This is certainly a correct interpretation, as both the
parties' situation and the nature of a contract share in the cir-
cumstances of a case. But it is submitted that other important
elements also find their place within the scope of the circum-
stances of a case, such as the experience of previous dealings
between the parties, the conventional usages of a particular
trade, and the nature of the thing 82 which forms the object
of the contract.
But what is the reasonable time the offeror may be supposed
to have given, according to the language found in Article 1809?
When the actual time has been set forth by the proposer, there
is, of course, no problem, as the period of time named by him
is the reasonable time meant by the article.188 Where no such
a time is named and, therefore, the presumption contained in
the article is to be applied, the circumstances of the .case should
lead to finding a substitute for the offeror's intention.184
It has been suggested that in such an event, the reasonable
period is the time necessary for the communication of the
acceptance, which "need not be more than but a moment if
the parties are in the presence of each other; whereas in other
situations, the time reasonably necessary would be that ordi-
narily required for the transmission of intelligence by the author-
ized or usual means of communication. In this respect, contracts
made in the present day by telephone or by radio should be
interpreted as contracts by parties in the presence of each
other." 8 5
have intended to give" found in the official English translation of the article.
Words such as "he is absolutely deemed to have given," would, perhaps,
convey an idea closer to the French text.
181. Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LL I& Rav. 183,
189 (1939).
182. Whether it is perishable or not, for instance.
183. Accord, 3 TOULLmR, Ls DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUITVANT LORDRE DU CODE
325 (1833); Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, I LA. L Rav. 183,
190 (1939).
184. Since, obviously, in case of a dispute, the offeror's contention, in
the vast majority of instances, will be that he did not intend to grant a
delay for acceptance. See 2 DzMoouE, TRirrT DES OBLiaAnoNs EN G*NqRAL 148
(1933).
185. Pascal, Duration and Revocablity of an Offer, 1 LA. L. Rav. 190
(1939).
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It is submitted that this interpretation states, very correctly,
what should be considered the minimum reasonable time the
offeror may be presumed to have given, but that, in some cases,
the circumstances may very well lead to the belief that a longer
time should be presumed to have been given, as where the com-
plexities of a contract demand special study or consideration.'8 0
Thus, the existence in the Louisiana law of a period of
irrevocability of an offer seems to be the natural conclusion of
a correct reading of the pertinent articles in the Civil Code.187
Against a similar interpretation of Article 1809, the objection
has been raised that the declared will of the party is made the
sole test of a binding obligation.188 This, it was said, seems to
be at odds with Article 1893, which declares that every obliga-
186. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRArrT PRATIQUE DE DROfI CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 156 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). See Housing Authority of Lake
Arthur v. T. Miller & Sons, 239 La. 966, 975, 120 So.2d 494, 498 (1960):
"It is common knowledge that a reasonable delay, in this instance a 30-day
period, is usually included in all bidding for public construction or works
preceding formal acceptance or award of the contract."
187. The following scheme has been proposed in Pascal, Duration and
R~evocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. Rsv. 195 (1939):
"I. An offer remains open and irrevocable:
"A. For the time expressly or impliedly given for acceptance; or
"B. If no time has been given by the proposer in his offer-for the
time reasonably necessary for the acceptance and its communica-
tion to the proposer; which Is computed by considering:
"1. The time required for communication to and from the party
to whom the proposition was made:
"a. In face to face offers (or offers by telephone or radio),
only an instant is required;
"b. In proposals to parties at a distance, only the time neces-
sary for the transmission of the proposal and the
acceptance by the authorized or usual means of com-
munication is required; and
"2. The time required for the act of acceptance, according to
the nature of the contract:
"a. In offers for bilateral contracts, this would be only the
moment necessary for the making of the promise;
"b. In offers for unilateral contracts, this would be only the
time necessary for the performance of the act or for-
bearance requested.
"II. After the expiration of the delays In IA and IB, above, the proposer
Is free to change his Intention, and need not declare so or notify
the other party of such fact;
"A. However, if the acceptance comes to his knowledge before the
lapse of time mentioned in III, the proposer must immediately
notify the accepter of his change of intention or be presumed
to have continued In that intention and be bound to the contract.
"I11. Yet, if the acceptance comes to the knowledge of the proposer so
long after his proposal that he cannot be presumed to be still of
the intention which his proposal expressed, the acceptance need not
be considered more than a counter offer."
188. O'Brien, Revocation of an Offer where the Offeror has Given the
Offeree a Stated Length of Time in which to Accept, 5 Tu. L. Rov. 632,
635 (1931).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
tion must have a cause, as defined in Article 1896.189 The following
words were used: "If intention or declared will is not cause
then these two articles are in conflict with Article 1809." 190
Although a discussion of the problem of cause cannot be under-
taken here, in order to overcome the objection it is sufficient
to notice that Article 1893 refers to the cause of obligations in
general, while Article 1896 clearly mentions the cause of a
contract, or conventional obligation. 191 As an offer is not yet a
contract until accepted,192 Article 1896 does not contribute any-
thing to the interpretation of Article 1809. In relation to Article
1893, it should be noticed that the obligation emerging out of
Article 1809 is an obligation imposed by the law, which is the
ultimate source of obligations. 19 8 If that is the case, then it is
not necessary to inquire about the motive, purpose, or end of
which the cause consists, as a legal obligation arises upon the
occurrence of a certain operative fact, without more.19 4 In this
case, the declaration of will by the offeror is the operative fact
that suffices to start the operation of the legal mechanism. 195
In French doctrine, those who adhere to the preliminary
contract theory in order to ground the obligation of the offeror
explain the cause, or but (end), of it is the principal contract
intended if the offer is accepted.'"
It is submitted that no contractual nature can be attributed,
in Louisiana law, to the offeror's obligation of maintaining his
proposition during a reasonable period of time. In effect, Article
1810, which has no equivalent in the French Civil Code, denies
189. "By the cause of the contract, in this section, is meant the con-
sideration or motive for making it; and a contract is said to be without
a cause, whenever the party was in error, supposing that which his induce-
ment for contraction to exist, when in fact it had never existed, or had
ceased to exist before the contract was made."
190. O'Brien, Revocation of an Offer where the Offeror has Given the
Offeree a Stated Length of T4ne in which to Accept, 5 TUL. L. REv. 635
(1931).
191. For a distinction, see 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 369 (1957). See also
Diaz Cruz, Causa and Consideration in Contracts-Exercises in Dialectical
Futility, 1 COMP. Jur. REv. 269 n.194 (1964).
192. LA. CIVIL CODS arts. 1800, 1803 and 1809 (1870).
193. Accord, 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION SY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 807, at 430 (1959). See also
1 PUIO BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART II 57-60 (1954).
194. See 1 LAFAILLE, CURSO DE OBLIGACIONES 34 (1940). See also Diaz
Cruz, Causa and Consideration in Contracts-Exercises in Dialectical Futility,
1 COMP. JUR. Rev. 172 n.55 (1964).
195. Accord, 1 PUIO BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DEREcHo CIVIL, PART II74-81 (1954); see generally, Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L.
Rev. 31-34 (1951).
196. CAPITANT, DE LA CAUSE DES OBuGATIONS 54 (1923).
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such a possibility. According to this article, the offer expires
with the death of the offeror, his survivors not being bound by
his promise.1 1 If the obligation derived from Article 1809 were
contractual, then the general rule of Article 1763 would apply.
On the other hand, after a reasonable period of time, the un-
accepted offer can be revoked by the sole dissent of the offeror,
while the revocation of a contractual obligation requires the
mutual consent of the parties.'"
In Louisiana law, due to the clear language of article 1809
of the Civil Code, the obligation to keep the offer open during
a reasonable time is the direct effect of the proposer's declara-
tion of will. It is not necessary, therefore, to resort to a fault
theory, or a preliminary contract theory, as in French law,
since, unlike the Code Napoleon, a clear provision in the Louisi-
ana Civil Code lends support to the modern theory of the bind-
ing effects of the unilateral declaration of will.199
The submitted interpretation of Article 1809 is consistent
with modern law. As an example, the Uniform Commercial
Code"O provides in Section 2-204:
"An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed
writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be
held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during
the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time,
but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed
three months; but any such term of assurance on a form
supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the
offeror."
197. The same solution prevails In French law, see AUBRY & RAU, COURS
DE DROT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOU-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 806 (1965); 6 PLANIOL & RPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGATIONS--PART I 160-62 (2d ed. Esmein 1952);
there are, however, exceptions: see C.d'Etat, Aug. 3, 1900, S. 1903, 3, 13;
Accord, 2 PANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATB LAW INSTITUTE) no. 970, at 562 (1959). But there is a
different solution in German law, where the B.G.B. § 153 provides: "The
conclusion of a contract is not prevented by the fact that the offeror dies or
becomes incapacitated before accepting, unless a contrary intention is to be
presumed." See Succession of Aurianne, 219 La. 701, 53 So.2d 901 (1951);
Hart v. Hart, 3 La. App. 622 (1926); cf. Gordon v. Stubbs, 36 La. Ann. 625
(1884).
198. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1901 (1870): "They [agreements] can not be
revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties, or for causes acknowledged
by law."
199. See 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELfMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS
386 (10th ed. 1953).
200. The ALI, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 official text).
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This modern precept presumes that a reasonable time is
given by the offeror, during which the offer is not revocable,
in a manner entirely similar to Article 1809. The fact that a
writing is required and a limit of three months is set for the
specific case of (a) an offer by a merchant (b) to buy or sell
goods implies a special regulation of the offer to enter a com-
mercial sale of goods not incompatible with the general-and
not specific-regulation found in Article 1809.
The Franco-Italian projet for a uniform code, drafted in 1928,
provides in its Article 2 that the offeror may revoke the pollici-
tation until the acceptance reaches his knowledge, but, if he
undertakes to keep the offer open during a certain delay, or if
such an undertaking may be presumed from the nature of the
transaction, the revocation before the expiration of such a delay
does not prevent the formation of the contract.20 1
The Mexican Civil Code Article 1805, provides: "When the
offer is made to a person present, without the stipulation of a
period for acceptance, the offeror incurs no liability unless the
acceptance is made immediately. The same rule applies to an
offer made by telephone." According to Article 1806 of the same
Code: "When the offer is made without the stipulation of a
period for acceptance to a person who is not present, the offeror
remains bound during three days, in addition to the time required
for the regular dispatch and return of mails by the public post
office, or in addition to the time judged by the court to be suffici-
ent in the absence of postal service, in accordance with the dis-
tances involved and the facility or difficulty of communication."' 2
Not only is a minimum reasonable time for acceptance allowed
by this Code, which is the time necessary to communicate a
determination, but an additional period of three days for advise-
ment or consideration, provided the parties are not face to face.
Louisiana Jurisprudence: In General
The above formulated interpretation of Articles 1800-1803
and 1809 of the Louisiana Civil Code is not entirely unsupported
by Louisiana jurisprudence.
In Boyd v. Cox 20 3 there was an offer to buy or sell an
201. Accord, 2 COLIN Hr CAPrrANT, COURS EL*MENTAIRM DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANgms 36 n.1 (10th ed. 1953).
202. MEXICAN CIVNIL CODE or 1883, for the Federal District and Territories.
Accord, FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 257 (1964).
203. 15 La. Ann. 609, 610 (1860).
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interest in a certain concern on the same terms. The parties
were negotiating face to face, and no agreement was reached
before they separated, but defendant's last words were that an
offer to sell or buy on the same terms was always a fair one
and that he was not disposed to change the offer he had made.20 4
Three days after the conversation, plaintiff telegraphed his
acceptance, and, upon its reception, defendant telegraphed back:
"I withdraw my proposition." Interpreting Articles 1801 and
1802,205 the court said that a proposition, an assent, and an
immediate signification of change of intention on the part of the
proposer prevented the formation of the contract. Apparently,
Article 1801 is taken out of context in order to assert that an
offer can be revoked after it has been accepted.20 6 But, actually,
the court carefully analyzed the facts in order to ascertain
whether anything in the situation of the parties or the nature
of the contract may have justified the presumption that defendant
intended to grant a period of time for plaintiff to make his
decision, and no such grounds were found. The conclusion is,
according to the court, that the defendant was not precluded by
anything in the situation of the parties, or in the nature of the
contract, from signifying to plaintiff his change of intention,
when he received the assent of the latter three days previously.
It seems clear that the court felt that, under the circumstances,
the offer called for an immediate acceptance.207 If that is true,
the decision is perfectly compatible with Code Articles 1800-
1804, and 1809 also, since it follows that three days was not a
reasonable period of time in this case.
In Union Sawmill Co. v. Mitchell2°8 suit was brought on
several printed form contracts purporting to be sales of standing
204. In Levy v. Levy, 114 La. 293, 28 So. 155 (1905), the offeror was
disposed to change his offer and did so while the offeree was writing out
his check. The court allowed the offeror to withdraw his offer, theorizing
that since the contract involved the sale of land, and since such a sale
must be in writing, oral acceptance was not sufficient to complete the con-
tract and that prior to completion either party could withdraw. The question
of duration of the offer was not raised, the court concluding that, under
the circumstances, the offer could be revoked at any time prior to acceptance.
205. Articles 1795 and 1796 of the Code of 1825, at the time that this
case was decided.
206. A similar error was committed in Corryalles v. Mossy, 2 La. 504
(1831), in which the court analogized an auction and a private sale and stated
that under Civil Code articles 1795 and 1796 (1825), an offer could be with-
drawn by the offeror after it had been accepted by the offeree.
207. Or, that in spite of the words attributed to defendant, the offer
lapsed when the parties separated.
208. 122 La. 900, 903, 48 So. 317, 318 (1909). A similar case, involving
the same plaintiff, is Union Saw Mill Co. v. Lake Lumber Co., 120 La. 106,
44 So. 1000 (1907), wherein the court reached the same conclusion.
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timber, payable as cut and removed. The contracts were not
signed by the vendees or purchasers, but it appeared that the
assignees of the purchasers, several months afterwards, executed
and recorded a notarial act accepting the contracts and binding
themselves to all the obligations stipulated. The action was
brought by the assignees trying to enjoin defendants, the alleged
sellers, from cutting timber. The court said that "the contracts
read as if intended to be signed by the vendee at the same time
as by the vendor. Nothing on their face indicates that there was
any intention to allow the vendee any delay for consideration.
• . . Under the circumstances, we think no more time was
intended to be allowed to the vendees than what might be
required to submit the contract to them for acceptance or
rejection." Not only did the court succeed in discouraging the
speculative purposes of the plaintiff, but the careful evaluation
of the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract 26
indicates the correct interpretation of Articles 1801 and 1802.
The comment as to the indirect application of Article 1809 is
valid here, as in the previous case.
In Picou v. St. Bernard Parish School Board,21° the facts
differ from the two preceding cases, as the negotiations between
the parties were not face to face, and there were no circum-
stances leading to the belief that the situation should be handled
as one where an immediate acceptance was required. The plain-
tiff had been appointed and employed by defendant school board.
A printed contract embodying the board's proposal was mailed
to the plaintiff, who accepted the proposal after twelve days.
The court held: "Certainly the twelve days taken up by her
for deliberation was in no manner unreasonable, and constituted
such delay under the provisions of our Code as are to be con-
templated as reasonable, and within the intention of the parties
making the offer."211 Articles 1802 and 1809 were invoked as
authority for the decision, and correctly interpreted by the
court, which after considering the facts reached the conclusion
209. In Nickerson v. Allen Bros. & Wadley, Ltd., 110 La. 194, 195, 34
So. 410 (1903), the landowner had made a counter offer concerning the sale
of standing timber "fifty cents a thousand. If you can use it at that price,
you can begin cutting at any time it Is convenient." The court decided that
the defendant offeree should have acted before two years had elapsed,
making reference to the situation of the parties and the terms of the offer.
210. 132 So. 130, 132 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1924).
211. But see O'Brien, Revocation of an Offer Where the Offeror Has
Given the Offeree a Stated Time in Which to Accept, 5 TUL. L. Rzv. 638-4(1931), where a different interpretation of the facts is given.
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that defendant could not have expected from plaintiff an im-
mediate reply or acceptance of her appointment.212
In Miller v. Douville,2 1s an offer had been delivered to plain-
tiff in writing to sell land located in Mississippi. It seems clear
that plaintiff had expressed his intention to examine the lands,
which intention defendant requested him to defer. But after
receiving the written offer, he proceeded to Mississippi. Mean-
while, defendants withdrew the offer by telegram, in spite of
which plaintiff delivered an acceptance in writing to defendant
after the revocation. After citing and analyzing common law
authorities, the court reached the conclusion that a proposal
may be revoked at any time before acceptance, a rule that, in
the mind of the court, is consistent with Article 1800.214
This decision contradicts, apparently, what was said before
about the interpretation of the code articles dealing with dura-
tion of the offer. However, it should be noticed that Article 1800
is the only precept invoked by the court, which means, obviously,
that the case is no authority for the interpretation of Article
1809. The decision was reached by isolating one single article
and taking it out of its context. It is submitted that this case
should be discarded any time that the interpretation of Articles
1801, 1802 and 1809 furnish the grounds for decision.2 15
In Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green,216 the defendants signed
an instrument purporting to engage the services of plaintiff in
212. The court remarked: "It is inconceivable . . . that the school
board could have expected of her an immediate reply to or acceptance of
her appointment." 132 So. at 132. This suggests that it is the offeror's intent
which is controlling. Properly, it is the offeree's reasonable understanding
of the offeror's intent which controls. In Luckett Land & Emigration Co. v.
Brown, 118 La. 943, 43 So. 628 (1907), the court stated the rule of appraisal
in better form: "If an acceptance was necessary, it was accepted by letter,
and by action within the time that the situation of the parties and the
nature of the contract showed it was the intention of the defendant (offeror)
to allow. Civ. Code, art. 1802." Thus, the objective standard is more apparent.
213. 45 IA. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893).
214. Id. at 218, 12 So. at 133. The court stated: "The article of the Rev.
Civil Code on the subject conveys but one meaning-if the promisor before
consent changes his intention, the concurrence of the two wills is wanting
and there is no contract." The court thus presupposes a right in the offeror
so to act.
215. There is sufficient language in the case to show that the court
thought plaintiff should have formalized a unilateral promise to sell from
defendant, which he did not do, thus neglecting the opportunity of availing
himself of an option. This was then possible without special consideration,
since, at that time, article 2462 had not been amended. The present authority
of this case is even more dubious after the amendment, as this is a case
dealing with an offer to sell, and the decision cannot be taken as meaning
more than what it actually decides.
216. 83 So.2d 449 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
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re-roofing their home. The document contained a description of
the work to be done and a statement of the price to be paid
in monthly installments. It was signed by the plaintiff's sales
representative with whom the negotiations had been conducted,
although he had no authority to accept the contract on behalf
of the plaintiff. The writing contained the following provision:
"This agreement shall become binding only upon written accep-
tance hereof, by the principal or authorized officer of the Con-
tractor, or upon commencing performance of the work.21  As the
work was to be done entirely on credit, plaintiff had to obtain
reports on defendant's credit rating and approval from the lend-
ing concern which was to finance the contract, all of which
was known by defendants.218 Plaintiff gathered the necessary
information, took the required steps in approximately seven
days, and obtained the financing entity's approval. The next day,
plaintiff engaged several workmen, loaded two trucks with
roofing materials, and proceeded from Shreveport, where its
branch was located-although the central office of plaintiff was in
Houston, Texas-to defendant's residence in Webster Parish.
Upon their arrival, 19 plaintiff's workmen were notified by de-
fendants that the work had been contracted to other parties
two days before.
The lower court entered judgment for defendants, saying
that they had timely notified plaintiff before "commencing per-
formance of the work," and asserting that the notice given to
plaintiff's workmen was sufficient to signify their intention to
withdraw from the contract.
The court of appeal reversed, after quoting from the Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts, 22 and held that the principles
there stated are recognized in the Civil Code. The court cited
Article 1809 and interpreted it as establishing that a reasonable
time is contemplated where no time is expressed; what is rea-
sonable depending upon the circumstances. The court concluded
217. Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
218. In The National Roofing & Siding Co. v. Navarro, 149 So.2d 648
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), the court held that the necessity of approving
credit was not sufficient to raise the implication that the offeror intended
that the offer be irrevocable for any period of time.
219. The question necessarily arises whether the revocation would have
been sufficient if the defendant had communicated it to the plaintiff prior to
the loading of the trucks. It is submitted that it would have been. See The
National Roofing & Siding Co. v. Navarro, id.; Loeb v. Johnson, 142 So.2d
518 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); AA Home Improvement Co. v. Cosem, 145 So.2d
624 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
220. Although not mentioned by the court, the reference is to section 40.
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that the loading of the truck was the commencement of the
work, which was one of the ways of accepting the offer, and
took place within a reasonable time. At this moment there was
a contract between the parties, a contract which defendants
breached when engaging others to do the work.
This decision is consistent with what was said before about
the real meaning of Article 1809. It is also consistent with
Article 1802, since defendants could not validly signify their
change of mind, as the acceptance had taken place within such
time as the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract
indicated that the defendants had allowed.
The court stressed the fact that the loading of the trucks
with materials marked the commencement of performance.
2 2 1
It is submitted that to be convincing this characterization of
the act of acceptance should have been complemented by the
presumption that defendants had waived their right to have the
acceptance communicated to them.2 2 Such a waiver could have
been found implied in the language of the contract, as the
parties covenanted that "this agreement shall become binding
• . . upon commencing performance of the work." The same
results could have been attained by asserting that the com-
mencement of performance took place when plaintiff's work-
men arrived at the defendants' home, since their presence there,
enhanced by the loaded trucks, could have no meaning other
than their readiness to perform.-The defendants could not then
have validly expressed a revocation that they had not expressed
before. In other words, the defendant's signification of dissent
was untimely under the circumstances.
In sum, although this case is one that lends itself to be
better understood in the light of Article 1802, the court arrived
at a very clear interpretation of Article 1809.
In National Roofing & Siding Co. v. Navarro,22 the defen-
dants signed a document offering to pay plaintiff a certain sum
of money to apply aluminum siding to their residence, and
deposited $100 on account. The offer was submitted on a form
prepared by the plaintiff contractor, and one of the clauses
221. This has led to suggestions that the case could be handled as an
example of offer to enter a unilateral contract, as it might very well be if
approached from a different perspective. See JONES, FARNSWORTH & YOUNG,
CONTRACTS 43, 45-46 (1965).
222. See 2 DEMOGUE, TRArrA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GANLRAL 189 (1923).
223. 149 So.2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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provided: "This contract is binding, subject only to acceptance
by an executive of the National Roofing & Siding Co., who
reserves the right to reject it without liability on its part."
As to the financing of the contract, it seems that plaintiff would
secure a loan for defendants from a certain financing com-
pany. But the day after the offer was signed, one of the defen-
dants telephoned the plaintiff's salesman to inform him that they
had changed their minds, and desired to cancel the contract.
The defendant was then advised that the "contract" had been
accepted, that the materials were already on delivery, and, there-
fore, there could be no cancellation. That same day, a small
truck containing a few materials for use in application of the
siding arrived at the defendant's home, but delivery was refused.
The next day, the defendants received a letter from plaintiff
informing them that the offer had been accepted. The letter had
been mailed a few hours after plaintiff was notified, by telephone,
of the revocation. In deciding this case, the court said that the
general rule relating to offer and acceptance is stated in Article
1800, and it interpreted Article 1809 as a limitation of the
principle set up in the former. Of Article 1809 the court stated:
"This article obviously places a limitation upon the general rule
that offers may be revoked any time before they are accepted,
and is applicable where the offeror has expressly stated an
intention to make the offer irrevocable within a stipulated
period of time or where the offer is of such a nature that from
its very terminology the implication is present that the offeror
intended to make it irrevocable for a reasonable period of time,
within which it would be necessary for the offeree to signify his
acceptance.'2
2 4
Following this premise, the court finally concluded that the
implication that the offeror intended to make his offer irrevoc-
able for any period of time before acceptance cannot be sup-
ported by the necessity of procuring financing and, therefore,
defendant's revocation was timely.225
The interpretation given by the court to Article 1809 in the
224. Id. at 651.
225. In this connection, the court said: "The fact that financing was
necessary before the work would be performed does not raise the implica-
tion that the offer was irrevocable until the offeree had time to procure
financing. Had the offer been timely accepted and ripened into a contract,
then the ability to procure financing would merely operate as a suspensive
condition to suspend performance until the loan was procured, or negate
the contract if financing was not available." id. at 653. This is a very real-
istic interpretation of the parties' intent.
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above-quoted paragraph contradicts, to some extent, what has
been said in previous pages about the manner in which the
article should be read. It is submitted that the court departed
from the language of the legal precept by seeking something in
the nature of the offer, or in its terminology, to give rise to the
implication of a reasonable time for acceptance. Instead, it should
have relied on the circumstances of the case, as the article has
it, which leads directly to the situation of the parties and the
nature of the contract, as stated in Article 1802. Thus, the inter-
pretation formulated by the court could not account for the
case of a contract by correspondence, thus eliminating partially
the wealth of legal significance to be found in Article 1809.
But the real thread leading to the correct understanding
of this decision lies in the following words: "an executive of
plaintiff who was authorized to accept the offer was apprised
thereof but had not accepted before the defendants revoked. 226
This language means that in the instant case, as in another
to be considered below, the court meant that the offer called
for an immediate acceptance, perhaps because of the parties'
location, perhaps because of the very nature of the contract.
The parties being reciprocally within immediate reach, the
rules of contracts between absent parties, the court seems to
have thought, ought to be but very carefully applied, and,
without clear indications to the contrary, the rules of arms-
length contracts should prevail.22 7 According to the circum-
stances of this case, the defendant could revoke the offer not
immediately accepted by plaintiff. It should be observed that this
conclusion is consistent with the interpretation of Article 1809
as formulated in preceding pages.
In the same case, disposing of an argument raised on the
grounds of a precedent, the court said: "A case is authority for
only what it actually decides."22 Such a statement formulates
226. Id. at 653.
227. The general rule for such contracts is that an offer may be revoked
at any time if not immediately accepted. The problem arises when the
courts, as they did in Miller v. Douville, overlook any consideration of article
1809. See, e.g., Chapital v. Walker, 36 So.2d 848 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948);
Vermilion Sugar Co. v. Vallee, 134 La. 661, 64 So. 670 (1941) (a decision
involving offers to purchase stock in a new corporation, which decision has
been corrected by subsequent legislation to the effect that such offers are
irrevocable for a certain period); Foster v. Morrison, 145 So. 13 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1933); Hanemann v. Ury, 9 La. App. 543 (Orl. Cir. 1928); Kaplan v.
Whitworth, 116 La. 337, 40 So. 723 (1906); Woodville v. Kantrowitz, 115 La.
810, 40 So. 174 (1905).
228. 149 So.2d at 652.
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a strict, and very wise, principle of interpretation. Taking advan-
tage of this principle, it can be said that this case is authority
for the rule that offers of this kind call for immediate acceptance,
or that the reasonable time implied for - acceptance is as brief
as the time it will take the offeree to learn of the offer and
immediately communicate his assent. As this is what was decided,
the manner in which the court read Article 1809 is, therefore,
obiter dictum, according to the very principle stated by the
same court.
In Wagenvoord Broadcasting Co. v. Canal Automatic Trans-
mission Service, Inc.,2" an action was brought by plaintiff broad-
casting company for specific performance of a contract for radio
advertising time or for damages. Plaintiff's representative had
contacted the defendant, and their negotiations had ended with
the latter signing an authorization order for radio advertising
with plaintiff's station. According to the language of the writing:
"When signed by the advertiser and accepted in writing by
Broadcasting Station WWOM, this order shall become an agree-
ment binding upon the respective parties." 0 The disputed con-
tract was accepted by plaintiff; but, several hours after the
defendant signed (although prior to knowledge of the accep-
tance by plaintiff) the defendant communicated to plaintiff the
withdrawal of its offer. At that moment, defendant was informed
that the offer had already been accepted and there was a contract
between the parties.
In deciding the case, the court classified the questions posed
for determination, separating two problems that are, indeed,
different:
"(1) Whether the acceptance of an offer must be com-
municated to the offeror in order to complete the
contract;
"(2) During what period of time is an offer irrevocable."'' 1
As to the first question, through a quotation of Planiol,282
the court reached the conclusion that the receipt theory of
acceptance should prevail. As this matter will be discussed
elsewhere, attention will be focused now on the second ques-
229. 176 So.2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
230. Id. at 189.
231. Id. at 190.
232. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITt ELMENTAIRz DE DROIT CIVIL, PART I No. 984 (1907).
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tion, which is, precisely, the duration of the offer. In this con-
nection, two statements by the court deserve special notice:
(1) "The general rule is that an offer can be revoked any
time prior to its acceptance."283
And, after mentioning Article 1809 as an exception to the
rule,
(2) "However, the jurisprudence indicates that a strong fact
situation would be necessary before the courts would
imply that an offer is irrevocable for any substantial
length of time."2' 4
Proceeding on those grounds, and after quoting an example
from Toullier very much in point,2 5 the court said: "Therefore,
we conclude that the plaintiff should upon immediate acceptance
of the offer which its agent submitted to it, have completed
the acceptance by promptly notifying the defendant. Instead
it waited until the defendant withdrew its offer by telephone.
Because defendant's offer was revocable at the time of its with-
drawal, no contract was ever consummated.123 6
The key to the court's interpretation of Article 1809 in this
case lies in the words "plaintiff should upon immediate accep-
tance," as this language leads to the conclusion that the time
plaintiff took to accept-and communicate its acceptance-was
more than that reasonable period of time, during which the
offeror, under the circumstances of the case, was bound not to
233. 176 So.2d at 191.
234. Id.
235. 3 TouLLER, LE DRoiT CIVIL FRANgAIS SUIVANT L'ORDRE DU CODE 325 n.3
(1833).
236. In Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. Harang, 10 La. App. 242, 243,
120 So. 416 (1929), plaintiff newspaper's agent and defendant, on October 4,
concluded negotiations, which contemplated a contract whereby plaintiff
newspaper would carry defendant's ad beginning on March 1, with defen-
dant making an offer to that effect to the plaintiff through the plaintiff's
agent. Plaintiff did not accept the offer until February 10, and upon notifi-
cation of the acceptance, the defendant refused to admit the existence of
the contract and refused to pay for the ads. The court asked, "was the
delay in affixing his signature unreasonable?" The court's response to the
question is quite logical. "It will be recalled that, though plaintiff signed
the Instrument October 4, 1926, the advertising was to begin March 1, 1927,
about five months thereafter. In accepting the contract February 10th,
nearly one month before the first advertisement was to appear, was there
not, under the very terms of the codal article cited (1802), an assent 'given
within such time as the situation of the parties and the nature of the con-
tract shall prove that it was the Intention of the proposer to allow?' The
answer must be in the affirmative." Id. at 242, 120 So. at 41.
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revoke. If that is so, Article 1809 has been correctly interpreted
and applied, since it is entirely up to the court to determine
what is a reasonable period of time according to the circum-
stances of each case. Provided there is any degree of concern in
ascertaining whether a reasonable time should be implied as
having been granted, the rule of Article 1809 is applied, even
if there is error in determining what is reasonable, according
to the facts.
Perhaps a different decision might have been reached had
the court thought that the words in the document signed by
defendant, "when . . . accepted in writing . . . this order shall
become an agreement," meant that defendant had resigned its
right to revoke during the period of time between acceptance
and communication thereof.28 7 Such interpretation of the facts
might have resulted in a different evaluation of what was a
reasonable time.
In the light of this interpretation of the decision, the two
quoted statements by the court gain a different perspective.
The first one certainly overstates the general rule, since the
offer can be revoked any time prior to acceptance, provided that
the offeror can validly revoke, and, for this, the requirements of
Article 1809 have to be fulfilled. This is the real rule according
to the Louisiana Civil Code, and the rule that, in an unmis-
takable manner, the court applied. In the manner in which it
was stated, however, the rule becomes mere dicta.
The second statement does not deny or in any manner
curtail this interpretation of Article 1809, but, on the contrary,
confirms it, because, unless a period of time is named by the
offeror, the court must supply the presumed intention as to the
reasonable time allowed, and such a presumption should always
be grounded in a "strong fact situation." To say that "the cir-
cumstances of the case," as in Article 1809, or "the situation
of the parties, and the nature of the contract," as in Article 1802,
should guide the decision, are words exactly to the same effect.
The reference in this decision to Union Sawmill Co. v.
Mitchell seems to indicate very clearly that the court is of the
mind that, because of the location of the parties, the situation
should be handled as one where the parties are present. This is
237. See 2 DxoouE, TRIAu DES OBLIGATIONS EN GiNtRAL 189 (1923).
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to say that, unless otherwise agreed by them, the acceptance
should be immediate, or in the most immediate manner.
Finally, it should be said that although the two questions
are clearly differentiated by the court, and constitute two very
distinct problems that should be separately discussed to achieve
some degree of clarity, they appear very closely linked together
in the vast majority of cases. Therefore, the answer given to
one of them will enlighten and complement the answer to be
given to the other. Thus, the fact that, in a certain situation, the
acceptance-and its communication-can take place immediately
after the offer will cast a bright beam of light upon the prob-
lem of ascertaining what was the reasonable time for acceptance
presumably intended by the offeror.2 38
The three preceding cases offer some similarities as to the
situations involved. On the other hand, the ruling of the Ever-
Tite case was debated in National Co. v. Navarro, and the latter
invoked as authority in the Wagenvoord decision. All this, at
first impression, seems to make the decisions contradictory. How-
ever, the cases present manifest differences and are clearly dis-
tinguishable. For instance, the language of the contracts in the
Ever-Tite and Wagenvoord decisions is not found in National
Co. v. Navarro. A consideration of three different locations is
involved in the Ever-Tite case, to wit: plaintiff's principal office
in Houston, Texas; plaintiff's branch in Shreveport, Louisiana;
and defendants' residence in Webster Parish, Louisiana. No such
circumstances are present in the other two'cases, where the
parties apparently were located in the same place. The special
stipulation making acceptance by commencement of the work
possible is also particular to the Ever-Tite case. In National
Co. v. Navarro, the financing of the contract depended directly
on a third party, while in the Ever-Tite case, credit was to be
granted by plaintiff, the contract, apparently, to be eventually
assigned to a third party. All these circumstances lead to the
conclusion that each decision is amply supported by the facts of
each situation. The careful determination of what is obiter
dictum in each case, on the other hand, will make clear the real
interpretation of Article 1809, as actual ratio decidendi, and not
mere incidental statement. To quote the court again, "a case
is authority for only what it actually decides. 2 89
238. See also Harding v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 177 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1939); Klefforth v. New Orleans Brew. Co., 8 Orl. App. 120 (1911).
239. 149 So.2d at 652.
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Louisiana Jurisprudence: Bids by a Subcontractor
In situations involving bids made by a subcontractor Lou-
isiana jurisprudence has also dealt with the problem of the
revocation of the offer. Bids of that kind, which are offers, and
the subsequent acceptance by the principal contractor, although
peculiar in their factual circumstances, do not fall outside the
general rules governing this matter. Thus, it has been decided
that those general rules of communication,2 4 0 counteroffer, 241
mistake,242 definiteness,248 and ability to perform2 44 apply. How-
ever, the question of the length of time during which the offer
is supposed to remain open is still unclear in this kind of
situation.
Article 1802 has not yet been analyzed by the jurisprudence
in this connection, but it seems logical that the factual circum-
stances present in such an offer-a subcontractor's bid-would
lead to no departure from the rule that the article asserts.
The offer should remain open for that length of time "as the
situation of the parties and the nature of the contract shall prove
that it was the intention of the proposer to allow."
In Harris v. Lillis,245 the facts seemed to fall within the pur-
view of Article 1809. The subcontractor submitted a bid and he
received a written acceptance of it. Discovering a mistake in his
bid, the subcontractor attempted to revoke it and cancel the
contract. The court held that the contract was completed by
communication of the acceptance and could not be cancelled. The
decision does not invoke any code authority at all, but it asserts,
instead, that a custom exists in the building trade of New
Orleans that the bid of a subcontractor cannot be revoked after
it has been used by the contractor in submitting his own bid,
which has been accepted by the owner of the property. In
stating this, the court made no mention of communication or
acceptance. However, this case was not actually decided on
240. Metal Bldg. Products Co. Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland, 144
So.2d 751 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
241. State ex rel. Range v. Madison Lumber Co., 6 La. App. 430 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1927).
242. Reimmar Const. Co. v. Heinz, 17 La. App. 687, 137 So. 355 (1931);
Schorr v. Nosacka, 16 La. App. 20, 132 So. 524 (1931).
243. West Carroll Nat. Bank of Oak Grove v. West Carroll Parish School
Board, 136 So.2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961): definiteness of offer; Worthing-
ton Const. Co. v. Parish of Jefferson Davis, 142 La. 659, 77 So. 492 (1918):
conformability of offer and acceptance.
244. J. G. Wagner v. City of Monroe, 52 La. Ann. 21$2, 28 So. 229 (1899).
245. 24 So.2d 689 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
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grounds of the alleged custom of the building trade. The opinion
discloses that the case was decided on the grounds that plaintiff,
the contractor, mailed his acceptance to the defendant, the sub-
contractor, who did not attempt to withdraw his offer until
more than one year afterwards. Therefore, the offer, having
being accepted before the attempted revocation, bound the
defendant.2 4B It is, thus, very clear, that the part of the opinion
which discusses the prevailing custom of the building trade was
not at all necessary to the decision nor intended as a general
rule.247 In other words, that part of the opinion constitutes
obiter dictum, as the court's real thought seems to have been
that a contract is perfected by the timely acceptance, on all
fours with Article 1803.
At first impression, it could be said that the alleged rule
comprised in the dictum may find support in Article 1809,248
but such is not the case. The rule offers two different aspects,
each of them meriting examination. In the first one, as the
court did not state clearly that a contract was created upon
acceptance of the bid, some language in the decision seems to
indicate that irrevocability commences with the use of the
subcontractor's bid by the contractor and its acceptance by the
owner.249 But, within the spectrum of Article 1809, irrevocability
commences, if at all, with the formulation of the offer; it is
not inserted as a middle term. In this aspect, it seems clear
that the decision deals, more properly, with methods of accep-
tance and the necessity of communicating the same to the offeror.
The second aspect of the rule is its connotation that the
subcontractor may revoke his offer at any time prior to its use
by the contractor and its acceptance by the owner. This also
fails to conform to Article 1809, since it overlooks the fact that,
according to the circumstances of the case, the bidder may have
246. Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 176 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1949).
247. Id. at 201: "It is the law in Louisiana as well as elsewhere; that a
custom cannot be looked to to change a rule of law, or to create a contract,
that a custom, when relied upon to take the place of a settled principle of
law, must be as definite and specific In negativing the principle as the law
which it assumes to supplant Is in affirming it. The evidence in this case,
as to custom, is wholly wanting in the requisite certainty, generality, and
reasonableness."
248. See Note, Revocation of Offer, 23 TUL. L. Rav. 286 (1949).
249. 24 So.2d 689, 691 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946): "Moreover, it seems
manifest that, in accordance with the custom prevailing in the building
trade In New Orleans, an offer by a subcontractor to a general contractor
to do work is irrevocable after the contractor has used the estimate of the
subcontractor as a basis for his offer to the owner and the owner has
accepted the general contractor's bid."
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intended that his offer be irrevocable for a reasonable period
of time.
In Albert v. R.P. Farnsworth,250 the federal district court
took the Harris v. Lillis rule at its face value and held that a
subcontractor, who had discovered an error in his bid, could
not revoke it after it had been utilized by the contractor and
accepted by the owner. Defendant's (the subcontractor) allega-
tion was that he had revoked before he learned of the acceptance
and, therefore, his change of mind was timely. The circuit
court 251 reversed the judgment, and interpreted Harris v. Lillis
according to its true holding. In the court of appeal's conten-
tion, the alleged custom of the building trade had been neither
pleaded nor proved clearly, but the opinion admits that real
proof of such custom or practice would be relevant in deter-
mining whether a reasonable time for acceptance was allowed.252
However, as the subcontractor knows that the principal con-
tractor will utilize the bid to complete his own and submit it
to the owner, it seems clear that a reasonable period of time
for acceptance is implied in such an offer, irrespective of the
existence of any particular custom. Therefore, the mechanics
of a transaction of this sort furnish a better ground for the
application of the rule of Article 1809 than the practices of a
trade.25 3
When the principal contractor utilizes the subcontractor's
bid in making his own offer to the owner, he is accepting the
subcontractor's bid, thereby giving rise to obligations that are
conditional upon acceptance of the owner.254 In fact, both parties
are perfectly aware that the principal contractor will only engage
the subcontractor in case the former's bid meets the owner's
250. 79 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. La. 1948).
251. 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949).
252. The case was remanded for a new trial, but nothing further is
reported on the Albert v. Farnsworth conflict. In a subsequent case, Metal
Bldg. Products Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 144 So.2d 751 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962), the rule in Harris v. L llis dictum is acknowledged, but the deci-
sion was based upon a specific acceptance of the subcontractor's bid.
253. This kind of reasoning is not entirely alien to the district court
decision in Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth, 79 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. La. 1948),
although no article of the Code was therein invoked.
254. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2021, 2043 (1870). See AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE
DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) 62 (1965); 2 Planlol, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PART
I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos.
374-88A (1959). 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITS3 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS, PART II 370, 378 (2d ed Esmeln 1952). O/. Blaushild v. Rockhold,
7 La. App. 709 (2d Cir. 1927). See also 2 DEMOGUE, TRArr DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GbNtRAL § 552, at 158 (1923).
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approval. The parties' obligations are thus subject to a suspen-
sive condition,25 5 but the contract of which the condition forms a
part is completed by the assent of the parties,256 although the
obligation cannot be executed until the event, of which the
condition consists, takes place.257 If the owner does not accept
the principal contractor's offer, then the contract between the
latter and the subcontractor will be resolved.258
A consequence of this analysis is that the principal contrac-
tor is bound to communicate to the subcontractor that his bid
has been submitted to the owner. As to this, the general rules
that govern the acceptance are applicable, and it cannot be said
that the acceptance by the principal contractor may be tacit, as
the subcontractor knows that others have also been invited to
submit bids. He has a right, therefore, to be apprised that his
bid has been preferred to others. Until the principal contractor
communicates that he has accepted the bid and submitted it to
the owner, the subcontractor may revoke, but not without allow-
ing a reasonable period of time for the contractor to decide which
bid is more convenient and communicate his decision.25 9 After
the contractor's acceptance and submission to the owner has been
communicated, the subcontractor cannot revoke for the very sim-
ple reason that the contract is already formed, although the
obligations thereof depend, ultimately, on the owner's approval.
This approval should be given within the time the parties have
anticipated and, if it is delayed for too long, it may become cer-
tain that the owner will not accept, in which case the contract
will be dissolved.260
This situation should not be confused with a conditional
acceptance that has no effect.261 It is not the offeree who sub-
255. Id.
256. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2028 (1870). C'f. Garig Transfer Co. v. Harris,
226 La. 117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954).
257. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2043 (1870).
258. Id. art. 2038. See AUBRY & RAU, COURS DE DRoT CIviL FRANAIS--
OBLIGATIONS-PART I (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE) 72 (1965): "Where the suspensive condition has failed the obliga-
tion and its correlative right are ipso facto considered as having never
existed."
259. LA. CvIL CODE art. 1809 (1870).
260. Id. art. 2038 (1870). In the last instance, it is always up to the court
to decide whether a condition has been fulfilled, or whether it can no
longer take place. See Cass. civ. March 30, 1938, S. 1938, 1, 227; Cas. 04v.
April 29, 1929, S. 1930, 1, 68, GAZ. PAL., June 15, 1929. See generally 7 PLANIOL
& RIPERT, TRArr PRATIQUE ,D Diorr CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 384-85
(2d ed. Esmein 1952).
261. LA. CwVm CODE art. 1805 (1870).
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jects his acceptance to a condition that was not intended by the
offeror; but both parties agree, in transactions of this kind, that
the obligations they are contracting are subject to a certain con-
dition. Their will ultimately prevails.2 2
Conclusions
The following conclusions may be drawn. At common law,
a distinction between duration of life expectancy of the offer and
power of revocation by the offeror has become current.0 3 But
this does not mean that within the period of duration the offeror
cannot revoke his proposition, which should, perhaps, be the
logical inference. Quite to the contrary, the duration of the offer
is entirely independent of the exercise by the offeror of his
power to revoke, which he can exert any time within that
period.2 64
In the language of the Restatement: "An offer until termi-
nated gives the offeree a continuing power to create a contract
by acceptance of the offer. '265 The next section clearly states
that an offer may be terminated by revocation by the offeror. 266
Common law courts have taken pains to assert that the power of
acceptance should not continue forever, but only for a reason-
able time, when no definite time limit was set at the inception.26 7
In Louisiana law, there is no reference to the offeree's power
of acceptance, but, in a more realistic terminology, reference is
made to the offeree's "right of concluding the contract by his
assent."2" The time during which the offer is presumed to
262. At common law, an offer by a subcontractor is considered revocable
unless supported by consideration, or made under seal. However, recent deci-
sions have resorted to the "promissory estoppel" doctrine to hold that kind of
offer Irrevocable during a certain period of time. See James Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); Cf. Northwestern Engi-
neering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W. 2d 879 (1943); Robert
Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941). See also
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 85(e) (1932). See generally Note, Revocation of
Offer, 23 TUL. L. REv. 286 (1949).
263. GiuSMoRn, CONTRACTS § 26, at 37, § 29, at 41, § 32, at 45 (Murray 1965).
264. Id. § 30, at 42.
265. Id. at § 34. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1964).
266. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 35 (1932).
267. See generally GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 28, at 39 (Murray 1965). See
also Mitchel v. Abbott, 86 Me. 338, 29 A. 1118 (1894); Park v. Whitney, 148
Mass. 278, 19 N.E. 161 (1889).
268. In fact, at common law no obligation can be spoken of until the
contract is concluded by the acceptance; the simple offer, unsupported by
consideration, is not legally obligatory and may be terminated with impunity.
As there is no obligation, therefore, no correlative right can exist, and there
is no other recourse, apparently, than to speak of a power with all the
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remain open is strongly connected with the time during which
the offeror cannot revoke, as his right to revoke only starts at
the expiration of the time he is presumed to have allowed for
the acceptance, according to the circumstances of the case. A
reading of Articles 1802 and 1809 leads to no other conclusion.
Thus, although it might be said that 1802 deals with lapse of
the offer, and 1809 with revocation of it, the irrevocability of the
offer extends over all the period of time during which the offer
remains open, or is so presumed according to the circumstances
of the case, the situation of the parties, and the nature of the
contract. The prolongation of the offer after that reasonable
period of time depends entirely on the offeror's will, according to
the terms of Article 1801. In a given situation, strong evidence
may support the view that the offer was intended to last indefi-
nitely.
The Contract of Option
It could be questioned whether the interpretation of Article
1809, as expounded above, can be considered valid in the light
of Article 2462.269 The second paragraph of this article, as
amended by Act 27 of 1920 reads:
"One may purchase the right, or option to accept or reject,
within a stipulated time, an offer or promise to sell, after
the purchase of such option, for any consideration therein
stipulated, such offer, or promise cannot be withdrawn
before the time agreed upon; and should it be accepted
within the time stipulated, the contract or agreement to sell,
evidenced by such promise and acceptance, may be specific-
ally enforced by either party."
At first impression, this legal text seems to suggest that the
offer or promise cannot be withdrawn only when any considera-
tion has been paid for it. Therefore, it seems to follow that when
no consideration is involved in a situation regulated by Article
Hohfeldian connotations. In Louisiana, instead, the offer binds the offeror
with a legal obligation which is not contractual. It is consistent, therefore,
to refer to the offeree's right of accepting thereby concluding the contract.
A different approach may be taken at common law when there is a statute
making an offer irrevocable. See New York Real Property Law, Part 2
§ 294(4). At civil law there is no confusion at all between obligation and
contract, as the latter is but one of the sources of which obligations derive.
See LA. CFIn CODE arts. 1756, 1761 and 2294 (1870).
269. See SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE Civiw CODE 473 (1925); O'Brien,
Revocation of an Offer where the Offeror has Given the Offense a Stated
Length of Time in which to Accept, 5 TUL. L. REv. 639 (1931). See also
Pascal, Duration and RevocabiZity of an Offer, 2 LA. L. Rzv. 189 n.47 (1939).
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1809, the offer could be withdrawn at any moment without allow-
ing a reasonable time. But certainly this is not the case. Article
2462 describes the contract of option, which is a form of the con-
tract of sale, and actually regulates a situation that by no means
should be confused with the one regulated in Article 1809.270
Under French law a contract of option goes at least one step
beyond the simple offer or pollicitation, as the offeree acknowl-
edges the proposition, reserving the right of having it under
advisement for the time of the option. There is, therefore, an
accord of the wills of the parties. The offeree may or may not
pay a consideration, as the parties are free to stipulate (or not)
a certain price for the privilege. The important factor in French
law, in matters of option, is the consent of both parties, and not
the payment of a consideration.2 7 1
In German law, the relevant matter is the length of the
period of time itself. As the German Civil Code prescribes a
minimum duration for the offer (which is the time necessary to
communicate the acceptance) 2 when the parties have agreed
on a longer period of time, they are said to have entered an
option.2 7 3 It is recognized that in practice the offeree usually
pays something for the option. 7 4
In Louisiana, the intent of the legal precept seems to be very
clear. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 2462
should not be taken out of context. The first paragraph in Arti-
cle 2462 reads: "A promise to sell, when there exists a reciprocal
consent of both parties as to the thing, the price and terms, and
which, if it relates to immovables, is in writing, so far amounts
to a sale, as to give either party the right to enforce specific per-
formance of same." Although containing important differences,
this paragraph reflects the same idea as Article 1589 of the Code
Napoleon.27 In the latter, the legislature's intent is that words
such as "I promise to sell" or "I will sell" shall have the same
270. See 2 Pua BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS Dz DERECHO CIVIL, PART II 50-57(1954).
271. See 2 CoLIN ET CAPrrANT, COURs EL MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS
554 (10th ed. 1953).
272. B.G.B. §§ 147-49.
273. See 2 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL, LERRBUCH DES BUR-
GERLICHEN RECHTS, PART II 679 (1955).
274. Id.
275. "The promise to sell amounts to a sale, when there is mutual
consent of both parties on the thing and the price." An act of July 30,
1930 introduced a second paragraph dealing with the sale of lots in sub-
divisions or developments.
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effect as "I hereby sell." To withdraw from the transaction con-
templated is possible only while there is no concurrence of the
parties' wills on the thing and the price. But, from the moment
the accord takes place, the sale is perfected, without necessity
of considering the subtleties of the language the parties may
have utilized.278
Article 1589 of the French Civil Code and Article 2462 (1) of
the Louisiana Civil Code regulate the synallagmatic, 277 or bilat-
eral, promise of sale. As such a transaction involves a promise
to buy, as well as a promise to sell, it amounts to a contract of
sale .2 7  Article 2462 (2) of the Louisiana Civil Code, instead, reg-
ulates the unilateral promise to sell, apparently not contem-
plated by the French article, according to criticism voiced in
French doctrine.279 In this case, there is only a promise to sell,
but not a promise to buy. However, the parties have expressly
agreed that one of them shall have the right to accept or reject
within the stipulated time.
An option is, therefore, a contract in which the requirement
of consent of both parties is properly fulfilled. An offer, instead,
is a proposition, or pollicitation by one party, without any mani-
festation of consent by the other.280 The contract of option gives
rise to the contractual obligation of the offeror not to revoke the
offer during the stipulated time. The simple offer gives rise to a
legal obligation of the offeror not to revoke during a reasonable
period of time.
It could be said that, if Article 1809 pronounces the offeror
bound for a certain time, the purchaser of an option would have
no advantage justifying the payment of a consideration.28' But
that is not the case. The obligations arising out of an option,
276. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 556
(10th ed. 1958). See Civ. Dec. 17, 1958, D. 1959, 33; Civ. June 10, 1941, D.A. 1941,
274; Paris, July 15, 1931, D.H. 1931, 498; Chamb6ry, Jan. 31, 1894, D.P. 95,
2, 347, S. 96, 2, 102.
277. "A bilateral or reciprocal contract, in which the parties expressly
enter into mutual engagements, each binding himself to the other." BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933). Responds to the idea of a commutative con-
tract as In LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1768 (1870).
278. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELAMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 556
(10th ed. 1953).
279. Id. at 554.
280. Id.
281. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2462(2) (1870) prescribes that a consideration
shall be paid for the option to make it enforceable, unlike French and
German doctrinal and jurisprudential developments.
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being contractual, will pass to the parties' heirs,282 thus preclud-
ing the operation of Article 1810. On the other hand, the option
may be transferred or assigned,2 8 while the simple offer or pol-
licitation, unless otherwise intended, is personal to the offeree
and cannot be transferred by him.2 8 4
It has been suggested that Article 2462 applies only to options
to buy or sell, and not to options to enter into any other kind
of contract.28 5 It is here submitted: (a) that the provisions of the
article in question, insofar as the payment of a consideration is
involved, are applicable only to the specific contract of option
to sell; (b) that those provisions are not applicable to options
relative to other contracts; (c) that Article 2462 is inapplicable
to cases of simple offers, even offers to sell, as these are regu-
lated by Article 1809.
It could be said, perhaps, that the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 2462 reflects the incorporation of the common law idea of
making an offer binding through the giving of a consideration.286
But, actually, the common law approach consists in viewing a
collateral contract as the support of the offer for the stipulated
time. The same result is reached at civil law by asserting that
an option is a contract unto itself, having as an object a stipu-
lated time during which the optionee will make a decision.287
282. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1763, 1999, and 1423 (1870). For a similar solution
at common law, See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 46-47 (1932).
283. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2642 et seq. (1870). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 47 (1932).
284. See 6 PLANIOL & RPERT, TRAITh PRATIQUE oE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-
OBLIGATIONS-PART I 162 (2d ed. Esmein 1952). For the same solution at
common law, see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 54 (1932).
285. See Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 LA. L. REv.
189 n.47 (1939). In 5 TuL. L. REv. 632, 639 (1931), the following language is
found: "The only conclusion then that could be arrived at logically Is that
the article here is speaking of the sale of an option. If that is so then the
article cannot possibly be pertinent in a discussion of our hypothetical case.
The reason of it is this; if it is a matter of a sale of an option then the
rules of sales will apply . . .These then being present we have something
more than the mere intention to be bound, something more than the mere
declared will of the offeror to consider ... "
286. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 46 (1932): "An offer for which such con-
sideration has been given or received as is necessary to make a promise
binding, or which is in such form as to make a promise in the offer binding
irrespective of consideration, cannot be terminated during the time fixed
in the offer itself or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time, either
by revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity." § 47: "An offer cannot
be terminated during the term therein stated, or if no term is therein stated
for a reasonable time, either by revocation or by the offeror's death or
Insanity, if by a collateral contract the offeror has undertaken not to
revoke the offer."
287. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ELMMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 554-56
(10th ed. 1953).
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The difference lies in the fact that a consideration is required
at common law, while at civil law the mere consent of both
parties suffices, without excluding, however, the possibility that
a price be paid for the option, as a matter of usage.
Thus, as shown, irrespective of the ideas reflected, Article
2462 of the Louisiana Civil Code is perfectly susceptible of being
interpreted in a manner consistent with civilian tradition.288
Liability for Untimely Revocation of Offer
As shown elsewhere, French jurisprudence is divided
between decisions awarding only recovery of expenses incurred
in reliance on the promise, and decisions awarding the full con-
tractual expectation. In French doctrine, the view is commonly
shared that the courts are sovereign in their appreciation of
which remedy better befits a particular situation according to
its own circumstances.28 9 The decisions of the first kind, protect-
ing only in part the reliance interest or negative contractual
interest,290 are generally based on a delictual theory as concep-
tual ground for the offeror's duty not to revoke. The decisions of
the second kind, protecting in full the expectation interest or
positive contractual interest, generally resort to the preliminary
contract theory as the basis for the same obligation.
It has been suggested that the preliminary contract theory
should be likened to the concept of culpa in contrahendo, of
German origin. 291 According to this concept, when two parties
start negotiations they enter into a pre-contractual connection
of an innominate kind and tacitly concluded whereby a relation-
ship of confidence arises, imposing upon the parties a duty of
288. As shown above, the express requirement that a price be paid for
the option does not alter the civilian frame of a unilateral promise to sell.
See id.
289. MAZEAUD & TUNC, TRAITfa TH9ORIQUE HT PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSIBILITri
CIVILE DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 151 (1963).
290. FULLER & PERDUE, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46
YALE L. J. 373 (1937); 2 Pure BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I
258 (1954).
291. Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French and Louisiana
Law, 15 TUL. L. REv. 94 (1941). This theory was first formulated by Rudolf
von Ihering in Culpa in contrahendo oder Bchadenersatz beinichtgen oder
nicht zur Perfektion geiangten Vertragen, which greatly influenced French
doctrine and jurisprudence through the translation by de Meulenaere: 2 VON
IHERING, OEUVRES CHOISIS (1893). See 6 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTh PRATQUz
DE DRorr CiWL FRANgAM-OBLIGATIONS-PART I 152, n.2 (2d ed. Esmein 1952);
1 DEMOGUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GitN1RAL 93-102 (1923); Saleilles, De la
Responsibilitd Pr6contractuelle, REV. TRIM. DROrr CIVIL 697 (1907); SALEILLEs,
THboRm Gb RNALE DE L'OBLIGATION 172-75 (3d ed. 1925).
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diligence in regard to the other party's reliance.292 This theory
is not mentioned in the German Civil Code, but it seems to have
inspired several isolated provisions.29 Invoking these provisions,
German doctrine and jurisprudence elaborated the principle
in a general fashion.294 It is, however, noteworthy that the culpa
in contrahendo theory is unnecessary in matters of revocation of
offers in German law, as the BGB expressly pronounces that
offers are irrevocable.2 9 5
Obviously, the similarities between the French preliminary
contract theory and the German culpa in contrahendo cannot
be doubted. Both approaches lead to the protection of the reliance
interest, or negative contractual interest, but do not grant full
recovery of the expected benefits.
292. 2 ENNECCERus-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BUROERLICHEN
RECHTS 190-91 (1958); 2 Puio BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I
225 (1954). The similarity with the formulation of the promissory estoppel
doctrine is noteworthy; See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); Accord,
Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French and Louisiana Law, 15
TUL. L. REV. 88 (1941); 2 PUIO BRUTAU, id. at 124-25; Snyder, Promissory
Estoppel as Tort, 35 IowA L. REv. 28-48 (1950). However, In general, the
culpa in contrahendo theory protects the negative contractual Interest, while
the promissory estoppel doctrine may afford protection to the positive, or
expectation, interest. See B.G.B. §§ 122, 179 and 307, and Fuller and Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 402 (1937).
The distinction between the positive contractual interest (positives
Vertrags Interesse or Erfillungsinteresse) and the negative contractual
interest (negatives Vertrags Interesse or Vertraueninteresse) is traditional
in German law. The word Erfi~llungsinteresse is perfectly equivalent to the
expression "expectation Interest," and Vertraueninteresse is a perfect trans-
lation of "reliance interest." But this distinction should not be confused
with that of the elements of damages, namely, the "loss sustained" (damnum
emergens) and the "gains prevented" (lucrum cessans)-see FRENCH CIVIL
CODE art. 1149 and LA. CIVL CODE art. 1934(3) (1870). In German law either
the positive or the negative contractual interest may comprise the loss
sustained and the gains prevented as well. However, when gains prevented
are recovered as a measure of protection of the negative contractual
interest it seems that the "gains prevented" must have been forseeable,
under the circumstances, as a probable consequence of the contract. See
ENNECCERUs-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS
62 (1959); 2 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDRY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL, LEHRBUCH DES BuRGER-
LICHEN RECHTS, PART II 733-34 (1955); BUSCH, DAS BURGERLICHE GESETZ3URH
(1929) annotations to §§ 122 and 252; Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 55-56 (1937). For a discussion
of the extension given in American case law to the protection of the
reliance interest see Fuller and Perdue, id. at 401-06. See also 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 60A (3d ed. 1957).
293. See, e.g., B.G.B., §§ 122, 149, 179, 307, 309, 463 and 663. See 2 ENNEC-
CERts-LEHMANNo SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BUROERLICHEN RECHTS 190-91
(1959).
294. ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS 190-91 (1959); Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French
and Louisiana Law, 15 TUL. L. REV. 91 (1941); 58 R.G.Z. 406 (1904); 65
R.G.Z. 239 (1911); 143 R.G.Z. 223 (1933).
295. Accord, Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French and
Louisiana Law, 15 TUL. L. REV. 91 (1941).
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In spite of the impact that culpa in contrahendo has upon
French doctrine, its incorporation into French law has been
resisted on very solid grounds. This theory, it is said, is useful
in German law because this system lacks a general principle
of delictual and quasi-delictual liability as the one asserted in
Article 1382 of the Code Napoleon.296 If there is no contract,
due to the fault of one of the parties engaged in the negotiations,
there cannot be a contractual liability, not even under the label
"pre-contractual. ''29 The party whose expectations have been
unjustly deceived will obtain reparation on grounds of quasi-
delictual liability. This does not mean that the party will
recover only the expenses he may have incurred, as the court
may grant specific performance, when possible, as reparation. 98
Although without clarifying the basis on which they were
proceeding, Louisiana courts, in matters of unlawful revocation
of offers, have granted recovery of the full contractual benefit,
thereby affording protection to the positive contractual interest,
or expectation interest.2 9 It is submitted that this solution is
not only fair, but it is the one clearly suggested in the Lou-
isiana Civil Code. A reading of articles 1802 and 1809 leads to
the conclusion that the obligation of a contract is complete
when the party to whom the proposition has been addressed
accepts it within the time during which the proposer cannot
revoke, and in spite of the latter's revocation, as he is bound by
his proposition.30o
296. Similar to LA. CwmL CoDR art. 2315 (1870). See 1 MAZEAUD & TUNC,
TRArrf TnoIQU ET PRATIQUE DR LA RESPONSxuITf CIVILE DELICTUELLE BT
CONTRACTUELLN 151 (1957); PIOTET, CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO 33 (1963). The lack
of such a principle in German law causes the action on quasi-delict to be
limited In its application; that Is what led von Ihering to develop his
doctrine in the fashion of a contractual one. Originally, von Ihering applied
it in three different situations: (a) when a party was incapable of conclud-
ing a contract; (b) when the contractual object was Impossible; (c) when
the will, or manifestation thereof, was defective. See 2 voN IHERING, OHUVsaS
CHOisIES 375 (1893). Accord, Schwenk, Culpa 4n Contrahendo in German,
French and Lou4iana Law, 15 TUL. L. Rnv. 88 (1941).
297. 1 MAZEAUD & TUNC, TRAITA THO0RIQUE ET PRATIQUE DR LA REsPoN-
SIBILTt CIVILE DI§LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLS 151 (1957).
298. Id.; accord, Cpr. Seine, Nov. 14, 1930, S. 1932, 2, 228; Rennes, July 8,
1929, D.H. 1929, 548.
299. Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. Green, 83 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1955); Ryder v. Frost, 3 La. Ann. 523 (1948); Times Picayune Publishing
Co. v. Harang, 10 La. App. 242, 120 So. 416 (Orl. Cir. 1929); Plcou v. St.
Bernard Parish School Board, 132 So. 130 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1924). Of. John-
son v. Capital City Ford Company, Inc., 85 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
300. The same doctrine underlies LA. CivmI CODE art. 2040 (1870): "The
condition Is considered as fulfilled, when the fulfillment of it has been
prevented by the party bound to perform it." Although the article should
be read to mean "the party bound under condition" (See Morrison v.
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This means that the Louisiana law provides a solution
unique in its clarity, which invites the following conclusions:
(1) There is no necessity, under the Louisiana law, of the
culpa in contrahendo doctrine, as the Civil Code provides a
general principle for delictual and quasi-delictual liability. There-
fore, the objections raised in French doctrine against German
theory are perfectly valid in Louisiana.801
(2) But neither is there necessity of resorting to the general
principle of quasi-delictual liability, because the Louisiana law
pronounces that, when the revocation is unlawful, the one who
accepted the offer timely has an action on the contract. The
offeror's obligation, born as a legal one, is replaced by a con-
tractual obligation upon the other party's timely consent. There-
fore, under Louisiana law, a contract may be formed in spite
of the dissent of one of the parties. This is precisely what French
courts and doctrine have been trying to say when stating that
the court may award performance of the contract as a remedy
although the action is brought in tort.802 The Louisiana solution
is more consistent, as the remedy, contractual in nature, is
awarded in an action on the contract. 0
Public Offers of Rewards
French Law
In matters of public offers of rewards, several situations are
distinguished in French law:
(a) The case where the reward is offered to the person
Mioton, 163 La. 1065, 113 So. 456 (1927)) the inference is clear that, if
the condition is suspensive, the contract will be held as perfected and the
obligation exigible.
301. Contra, Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in German, French and
Louisiana Law, 15 TUL. L. REv. 87-99 (1941). Cf. Note, Measure of Recovery
for Change of Position under Unenforceable Contract-Culpa in Contrahendo,
25 TUL. L. REv. 133 (1950).
302. Cf. Latter & Blum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 La. 490, 498,
23 So.2d 193, 195 (1945). Although this case is not in point, since no real
problem of revocation was involved, the following statement by the court
is noteworthy: "Mr. Richards could not be held in tort for the reason
that he had just ground to believe that the negotiations between him and
the plaintiff were terminated when his offer to purchase was in effect
rejected." The question remains unanswered whether Mr. Richards would
have had such an action in tort, provided evidence was to the contrary,
or an action on the contract.
303. In German doctrine, the theory of culpa post contrahendum was
developed in symmetry with culpa in contrahendo. As the theory belongs
to the field of obligations of the parties after the contract has been
performed, this is not proper occasion to discuss it. Suffice it to say that
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who will render a certain service to the offeror, such as return-
ing a lost object, or furnishing information as to the where-
abouts of a missing person. In this situation, the first problem
to be solved is whether the revocation of the offer can be
opposed to the one who, with knowledge of the offer, has ren-
dered the service without having learned of the revocation.
Assuming that the revocation has received the same publicity
as the offer, a negative answer has been advanced. It has been
said that, in making an offer to the public, the offeror assumes
the risk of binding himself to anyone, as he is unable to com-
municate the withdrawal of the offer to the one who takes
action, for the simple reason that the former does not know
the identity of the latter. 0 4
A second problem is whether the reward can be demanded
by the one who has rendered the service without knowing of
the offer. An affirmative answer is given by those who adhere
to the view that a unilateral declaration of will may have binding
effects.805 Those supporting the contrary view agree that, in
such a situation, there is no contract because of the lack of
consent, although the offeror who benefits from the service ren-
dered owes some kind of compensation. This, however, is not
due on a contractual basis, but as a matter of gestion d'affaires,
or unjust enrichment, which means that the final award will
be determined by the court.80 6
In case the same service is rendered by several persons
independently, the offeror is not bound to pay the reward to
each of them, because the offer should be understood as made
to the "first one" who renders the service. In other words, the
one who undertakes to render the service without securing the
offeror's previous accord is assuming a risk in this respect.80 7
(b) Where the reward is offered for some difficult or
remarkable performance, such as a scientific discovery, or a new
record in sports, the withdrawal of the offer presents the same
this matter is covered by LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1903 (1870), similar to article
1135 of the FRENCH CIVIL CODE. See DAHM, DEUTSCHES RECHT 538 (1951);
Accord, 2 Puio BRUTAU, FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CIVIL, PART I 259 (1954).
304. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITh PRATIQUE Dn DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS-OBLIA-
TIONS-PART I 164 (2d ed. Esmein 1952); Cf. 2 DIEMOGUE, TRArr1 DES OBUGATIONS
IN GAN.RAL 264 (1923).
305. See, e.g., 2 DsMocun, TRAIT9 DES OBUOATIONS EN G*MR~AL 204, 267
(1923). The citation of Belgian and Italian decisions by French writers on
this matter is noteworthy.
306. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAItb PRATIQUE Dz Dsorr CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 165 (2d. Esmein 1952).
307. Ibid; 2 DEMoOuz, TRAITh DES OBLIGATIONS EN GWNmRAL 267 (1923).
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problem as in the preceding situation, and the same kind of
answer is advanced.
If several persons claim the same kind of achievement, it
seems likely that the reward should be granted to the one who
accomplished it first, and not to the one who made it known
first. However, if a certain delay was fixed for making the
achievement known, the reward could not be claimed after the
expiration of the delay, even if accomplishment prior to that
moment is invoked.808
Unlike the situation discussed before, in cases of this kind
it is agreed that the reward can be claimed by the one who
performs in ignorance of the promise. As a justification, it is
asserted that the value of performances of this kind is not sus-
ceptible of being assessed in money. If the offer is not with-
drawn, the contract would take place at the moment the reward
is demanded.89 This presents a noticeable doctrinal difference
from the previous case, where lack of knowledge of the offer
is said to amount to lack of consent, and there is, therefore,
no contract as basis for the claim.
When a reward is promised to the winner of a contest,
the qualifications are determined by the language of the promise,
or its interpretation according to the goals pursued.810 If there
is a jury for the contest, its decisions are sovereign provided the
rules of the contest are complied with, unless fraud can be
attributed to a contestant, a judge, or juror.811
(c) Where a reward is offered for proving that a certain
assertion by the offeror is unwarranted, for instance, that a
certain product may prevent or cure illness, it has been advanced
that there was a bet, or wager, not giving rise to an action,812
as the promisor would not have an actual interest in having his
assertion defeated. However, the reciprocal promises involved
in a wager are lacking here and the mere fact of the promise
evidences that the offeror has an actual interest in making it.
When made by a vendor, such an offer could be validated as a
308. 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT13 PRATIQUO DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 165 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
309. Id. at 166.
310. Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 6, 1911, D. 1912, 3, 1, S. 1914, 3, 85; April 7,
1911, D. 1913, 2, 74, S. 1913, 3, 149.
311. Rappr. Agen, Oct. 22, 1895, GAz. PAL., 95, 2, 490.
312. FRENCH CnL CODE art. 1965, similar to LA. CnL CODE art. 2983 (1870):
"The law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at gaming
or by a bet .. "
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promise of warranty styled as a penal clause,813 unless the cir-
cumstances are such that third parties could never have thought
that the promise was serious. 14
(d) If the act performed was the performer's duty, he
should not be entitled to the reward, such as a police officer
who finds stolen goods.81 5
The legal nature of a promise of reward has been the subject
of discussion in French doctrine. Its binding character has been
attributed to the fact that such a promise should be taken as a
unilateral declaration of will. This solution, it was said, is the
one accounting better for the practical rules applicable.816 But
the view has been advanced that such a promise amounts to a
contract at the moment it is tacitly accepted by an interested
party.817 Finally, such promises have been considered as giving
rise to a contract with an undetermined party.81 8 This last solu-
tion seems to explain the fact that the obligation passes to the
promisor's heirs, even if he dies before the other party under-
takes to perform the act.8 19
German Law
In German law, the public promise of a reward is regulated
in book 2, section 7 (title 9) of the Civil Code. This is the
section in which the BGB deals with obligations in particular
and regulates all the different transactions that constitute special
contracts. However, it is generally assumed that, in the case
of rewards, the German Code has abandoned the contractual
approach, recognizing instead that such a promise is a unilateral
binding promise.82 In the contractual approach, the promise of
a reward is but an offer to contract addressed to everyone or to
a certain category of persons that becomes binding when accepted
by performance of the act, and is not susceptible of being
313. See FRSNCH Civit CODE art. 1226, and LA. CivIL CODE art. 2117 (1870).
314. 6 PLANIOL & RPERT, TRATi PRATIQUE DE DROIr CIVIL FRANgAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS---PART I 166 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
315. Casale, July 24, 1907, G4WrAtaL, 1907, 2, 712, cited in 2 DEM0Um,
TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GtNEIRAL 267 (1923). It is significant that the police
officer involved in the case was a foreigner whose duty was, owed to a
different sovereign.
316. 2 DEMOOUE, TRAIt DES OBLIGATIONS IN GhN]RAL 267 (1923); 1 id. at 45.
317. See 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, T~tArrT PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANgAIS--OBLIGA-
TIONS-PART I 164-66 (2d ed. Esmein 1952).
318. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS EL]MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 37(10th ed. 1953).
319. 2 DEMOGuE, TRAIrA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GhNtRAL 267 (1923).




accepted in any other manner.8 2' Thus, according to this ap-
proach, the contract is perfected only when the act is per-
formed with the intention of accepting the offer. But section 657
of the BGB adopts the contrary view that the reward can be
demanded even when the act has been performed without regard
to the promise.m
Public notice is essential to this kind of promise, and the
notice will be considered public only when it can reach a large
number of undetermined persons, although it is immaterial that,
in fact, the notice has reached only a few. 828
Unless the promise contains a special provision to the
contrary, it can be revoked before the act is performed.82 4 The
revocation must be made in the same manner and receive the
same publicity as the promise.32 5 If such a revocation is com-
municated to a person in particular, it will have effect as to
this person only."" If timely made, the withdrawal of the
promise does not give a right to recover damages to the one
who has incurred expense in preparation of performance.82
The power to revoke does not belong to the promisor exclusively,
but it can also be exercised by his heirs.82 8 However, such a
power can be waived; moreover, when a term has been named
for the performance of the act, it shall be presumed, in case of
doubt, that the promisor resigned the power to revoke.8 29 The
public promise of a reward can be impugned because of error,
violence, or fraud, but, as the promise is revocable, action on
those grounds will be meaningful only after the act has been
performed, or when the power of revocation has been expressly
resigned.u0
If the same act has been performed several times by dif-
ferent persons, the reward shall be granted to the one who
821. Id,.
822. B.G.B. art. 657: "The one who by public notice announces a
reward for the performance of an act, e.g., for a certain achievement, is
bound to pay the reward to any person who has performed the act, even
when this person did not act with a view to the reward."
323. 2 ENNECCERus-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS 677 (1958).
324. B.G.B. art. 658.
825. B.G.B. art. 658.




329. B.G.B. art. 658
330. 2 ENNECCERUS-LmHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BUROERLICHEN
RECHTs 678 (1958).
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performed it first, 81 unless the promise is to be understood as
made to each and everyone performing the act.33 2 If several
persons performed the act at the same time, all of them shall
share the reward, but, if the reward is indivisible, lots shall be
drawn in order to decide who gets the reward.833 If several
persons have contributed to the success of the undertaking,
such as when a criminal is captured by more than one person,
the reward shall be divided among all of them equitably, with
a regard to the degree in which each one participated in bringing
about the desired result.8 4
Special rules govern the case of contests for a prize. This
situation is distinguished from the simple public promise of a
reward, because the prize is not promised to anyone who will
perform a certain act, but only to those, who, in the first place,
enter the contest, and, in the second place, qualify to be awarded
the prize.835 In situations of this kind, there must be a term
fixed for the contest in the public notice, otherwise the promisor
could retard indefinitely the awarding of the prize under pretext
of waiting for the entry of more contestants. Because of a
term being fixed, the promise of the prize becomes irrevocable
in case of doubt. 3 6 The decision as to which contestant fulfills
the conditions under which the reward was promised, or which
among several contestants deserves the preference, shall be
made by the contest judge named in the notice of reward.337
In the absence of such a designation, the decision shall be made
by the promisor. 38 This decision is binding upon the interested
331. B.G.B. art. 659.
332. 2 ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS 679 (1958).
333. B.G.B. art. 659.
334. B.G.B. art. 660. The division of the reward by the promisor is
not binding if inequitably made; in that case the reward shall be divided
by judicial order. If the division is objected to by one of the claimants,
the promisor may refuse payment or delivery of the reward until the
different claimants have settled the dispute among themselves. In the case
of rewards promised to those who will furnish evidence that a certain
assertion by the promisor is unwarranted, German courts have, generally,
declared such promises null for lack of serious intent. Art. 762 of the
B.G.B.: "No obligation arises out of gaming and betting" has also been
invoked to the same effect. But German doctrine criticizes this line of
jurisprudence. See ENNEcCERUS-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BUR-
GERLICHEN REcHTS 677-78 (1958): Miknchen Oberlandsgericht, 72 SEUFrERTS
ARCHIV 36 (1917).
335. ENNECCERus-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT, LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS 680 (1958).
336. B.G.B. art. 661(1).
837. ENNEccERus-LEHMANN, SCHULDRECHT LEHRBUCH DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTs 680 (1958); B.G.B. art. 658(2).
338. B.G.B. art. 661(2).
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parties.8 39 If several contestants are equally deserving of the
prize, it shall be divided, and, if indivisible, lots shall be drawn
as in the cases previously discussed.840
Common Law
In common law, the promise of a reward is within the
framework of the Anglo-American notion of a unilateral con-
tract, in which an act is requested in return for a promise.8 41
Can such an offer be accepted by one who does not have
the knowledge of its existence, as, for instance, when a person
brings about the arrest of a criminal without knowing that a
reward has been offered for his capture? A few decisions have
held that a contract does come into existence in such a situa-
tion.3 42 In other instances where the promise had been made by
a city or a public corporation,83 the same view has been held
and supported on the theory that it is a public grant, and, there-
fore, it is not within the field of contract.84 4 But the majority
of the courts have adhered to the view that there is no contract
unless the offeree had knowledge of the offer when he per-
formed the act constituting the alleged acceptance; 84 5 otherwise,
339. B.G.B. art. 661(2).
340. B.G.B. arts. 661(3), 659(1) and (2). If the notice made clear that
the promisor would be entitled to the ownership of the thing produced
by the winning competitor, the former has a right to demand that the
transfer be made.
341. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 64 (1952); GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 18, at 18, § 32(Murray 1965); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 33A (3d ed. 1957).
342. Sullivan v. Phillips, 178 Ind. 164, 98 N.E. 868 (1912); Gibbons
v. Proctor, 64 L.T. 594 (1891); Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170 (1872); Wil-
liams v. Carwardine, in the King's Bench, 4 Barn. & Adol. 621 (1833). See
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 59 (1952); GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 43 (Murray 1965);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 33A (3d ed. 1957). The reason for these decisions
was the court's feeling that since the defendants received the benefits which
they requested and for which they were prepared to pay, they should be
required to pay.
343. Choice v. City of Dallas, 210 S.W. 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375, 99 S.W. 1111, 9 L.R.A. 1057 (1907);
Clinton County v. Davis, 162 Ind. 60, 69 N.E. 680, 64 L.R.A. 780, 1 Ann.
Cas. 282 (1904).
344. See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 59, at 94 (1952): "But whether it is within
this field depends solely upon the way in which we choose to delimit the
field. Whether the promise of reward is public or private, it may equally
well be called a 'grant'; and in either case the result is that we have an
enforceable promise. The recovery is the amount or value of the perform-
ance promised, not the value of the performance rendered by the plaintiff
and received by the defendant. The remedy is the customary contract
remedy."
345. Arkansas Bankers Ass'n. v. Ligon, 174 Ark. 234, 295 S.W. 4, 53
A.L.R. 534 (1927); Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501, 87 S.W. 949, 70
L.R.A. 59 (1905). See generally FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 827
(1964): "The Weight of Authority." For a discussion of the importance to
be given the motivation for the acceptance, see GmIsMo0n, CONTRACTS § 44
(Murray 1965).
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it is felt, there would be no conformity to the general require-
ment of mutual assent. 84 6 This is the solution adopted in the
Restatement, section 23, according to which the offeree should
know that a proposal has been made to him. This rather general
rule is complemented by the one in section 28 prescribing that:
"An offer may be made to a specified person or persons or class
of persons, or it may be made to anyone or to everyone to whom
it becomes known."8 47 This rule has been extended to an offeree
who gained knowledge of the offer after he had already rendered
part performance. In such a case no contract was said to exist,
in spite of the fact that the person who learns that a reward
was offered after already having partly performed will generally
proceed with the performance relying on the offer and with
expectation of the reward . 4 A negative reaction was contained
in the first Restatement, section 53, which prescribed that the
whole consideration requested by an offer must be given after
the offeree knows 49 of the offer. However, this view is changed
in the proposed Restatement Second, and section 53 now reads:
"Unless the offeror manifests a contrary intention, an offeree
who learns of an offer after he has rendered part of the perfor-
mance requested by the offer may accept by completing the
requested performance."
In matters pertaining to the revocability of such an offer,
made to the world at large, an exception is introduced that the
revocation is ineffective until communicated. If this were ob-
served, it would amount to making such an offer practically
irrevocable, as the offeror could never reach the hundreds,
thousands, or millions of people who may have learned of his
offer.850 Because of this, it has been held that such an offer is
considered effectively revoked when the offeror has published
his intent to revoke through the same medium and to the
346. See GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 43, at 61 (Murray 1965); 1 WnLuSTON,
CONTRACTS § 3&A, at 93 (3d ed. 1957).
347. Emphasis added.
348. See CoRsIN, CONTRACTS § 60, at 95 (1952): "If the offeree's part per-
formance rendered after he knows of the offer is not regarded as an
'acceptance,' it should be held to satisfy the requirements of the rule in
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90, wherein certain promises are declared to be
binding contracts in the absence of both mutual assent and consideration.
In the present instance it is not necessary to appeal to that rule." But see
Hoggard v. Dickerson, 180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S.W. 1135, 1138 (1914). Cf. Hen-
derson, Land & Lumber Co. v. Barber, 17 Ala. App. 337, 85 So. 35 (1920).
349. Emphasis added.
350. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 41, at 68-69 (1952); GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 33,
at 51 (Murray 1965).
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same extent that the original offer was published. 5 1 In support
of this view it is advanced that the offeree should reasonably
anticipate that a revocation will perhaps be made in this way;
and if he neglects to keep informed, he cannot complain when
his attempted acceptance is held ineffective. 5 2 This is the rule
in the Restatement, section 43: "An offer made by advertisement
in a newspaper, or by a general notification, to the public or to
a number of persons whose identity is unknown to the offeror,
is revoked by an advertisement or general notice given publicity
equal to that given to the offer before a contract has been created
by acceptance of the offer." 358
Where the requested services are performed by more than
one person so that the requested result is a joint "enterprise,"
351. Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73, 76 (1875): "Like any other
offer of a contract, it might, therefore, be withdrawn before rights had
accrued under it; and it was withdrawn through the same channel in
which it was made. The same notoriety was given to the revocation that
was given to the offer. . . ." See CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 41, at 68 (1952): "The
facts of the case were as follows: President Andrew Johnson issued a
proclamation offering a reward of $25,000 for the apprehension of John H.
Surratt, believed to be implicated in the murder of Abraham Lincoln.
Later he issued a similar proclamation revoking the offer. One Ste. Marie,
a zouave in the service of the Papal Government knew of the original
offer, recognized Surratt in the same service, and caused his arrest. This
service was rendered by him after the proclamation of revocation was
published but wholly without knowledge of it. The court held, as one of
the reasons for refusing judgment for the reward, that the revocation was
effective."
352. GRISMORE, CONTRACTS § 32, at 47 (Murray 1965).
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 43 reads: "Where an offer is
made by advertisement in a newspaper or other general notification to
the public or to a number of persons whose identity is unknown to the
offeror, the offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when a notice of
termination is given publicity by advertisement or other general notifi-
cation equal to that given to the offer and no better means of notification
is reasonably available." For a discussion of the possibility of revoking
through a radio broadcast a public offer made through a newspaper see 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 59A, at 185 (3d ed. 1957). Where the offeror, sub-
sequent to the offer, learned the identity of the members of the class
of offerees, notice of revocation published In the same manner was not
effective since the reasonable thing to do was to communicate directly
with each one; Long v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 68 Cal. App. 171, 228 P. 873 (1924)
(the case dealt with a subscription contest). For a discussion of revoca-
tion after commencement of performance, see generally GRISMORE, CONTRACTS
§ 33, at 51 (Murray 1965): "A satisfactory solution to the problem may be
In the offing as a result of increased willingness on the part of some
courts to enforce a promise which causes another to expend effort or incur
expense in reliance on the promise when the promisor should reasonably
anticipate that such reliance would occur. If the concept of detrimental
reliance continues to gain acceptance, there is a strong probability that
the cases which permit the offeror to revoke under these circumstances
will be disregarded."
The similarity between the solution discussed in text and article 658
of the GERMAN CIVIL CODE is noteworthy.
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it has been decided that they are jointly entitled to the reward.3 54
Where several persons have acted without collaboration, each
contributing a piece of information or doing one of the requested
acts, the final result being the sum total of their independent
acts, it has been held that no one is entitled to the reward or
to any part of it.3 55 Where the requested performance is within
the public or official duties of the offeree, then the performance
is not sufficient consideration for the promised reward. 56
Louisiana Law
In Louisiana, as in France, but not in Germany, the Civil
Code does not provide specifically for the case of the public
offer of a reward. However, the courts have asserted without
hesitation that: "The public offer of a reward for the recovery
of lost or stolen property creates an obligation which may be
enforced by the person through whom the property is restored. '3 57
In some instances no obligation arises out of the public offer
because no such power is within the scope of authority of the
offeror. Thus, it was decided that school boards are not author-
ized to offer rewards for the detection and punishment of crime,
and such an act is ultra vires85 3 In interpreting the terms of
public offers, Louisiana courts have been rather liberal. In
354. Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S.W. 532 (1915); see CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 64, at 105 (1952). Compare with article 660 of the B.G.B.
355. Stair v. Heska Amone Cong., 128 Tenn. 190, 159 S.W. 840 (1913);
Of. Taft v. Hyatt, 105 Kan. 35, 180 P. 213 (1919). See CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 64, at 105 (1952): "In some cases, however, the offeror actually regards
himself as bound and pays the money. The litigation, if any, is then as to
the proper subdivision of the reward, the action being in the nature of an
Interpleader, whether brought by the offeror or by some of the claimants.
In these cases, the courts have divided the reward in proportion to the
service rendered, roughly estimated." See also Maggi v. Cassidy, 181 N.W.
27, 190 Iowa 933 (1921). Compare with articles 659 and 660 of the B.G.B.
356. Gehrett v. Ferguson's Estate, 83 Ind. App. 717, 149 N.E. 86 (1925);
VanBoskerck v. Aronson, 197 N.Y.S. 809 (1923); Gray v. Martino, 91 N.J.L.
462, 103 A. 24 (1918). See CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 180 at 261 (1952): "Govern-
mental offers of a reward may be made in such a way, either by legislative
act or by an authorized official, that they may be accepted and the reward
earned by the police or other public officers. In such cases, the public
policy involved is determined by the representatives of the public duly
empowered for the purpose." See also United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S.
381 (1899).
For the offer of a reward for the winning of a prize contest, also
considered within the framework of unilateral contracts, see CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 25 at 43 (1952); see also Scott v. People's Monthly Co., 209 Iowa 503,
228 N.W. 263, 67 A.L.R. 413 (1929).
357. Wallace v. Irwin, 4 Peltier's Orl. App. 652 (1921); Salbadore v.
Crescent Mut. Ins. Co., 22 La. Ann. 838 (1870); Deslondes v. Wilson, 5 La.
397, 25 Am. Dec. 187n. (1833).
358. Luchini v. Police Jury, 126 La. 972, 53 So. 68 (1910). But police
Juries have the power to offer rewards. Murray v. Kennedy, 15 La. Ann.
385, 77 Am. Dec. 189 (1860), is interesting in this connection: "Where a
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Deslondes v. Wilson,8 9 for instance, where a portion of stolen
property was returned, the court held that the finder was entitled
to a part of the reward proportionate to the value of the
recovered property as compared to the value of the whole of the
lost property. In Salbadore v. Crescent Mutual Ins. Co.,86° the
insurance company had offered a reward for the conviction of
any person guilty of the crime of arson. Plaintiff furnished
information that led to the conviction of a certain person, but
defendant refused payment of the reward on the grounds that
the crime reported by plaintiff had been committed before the
publication of the offer, while the reward was intended for
information about crimes committed after publication. The court
held for plaintiff stating that the terms of the reward were
determined by its wording, and not by any unrevealed intent
of the offeror amounting, perhaps, to a mental reservation.86 1
It has also been decided that the one who offers a reward
may attach such conditions as he wishes, and that he may
make himself the sole judge of what shall constitute the ex-
pected performance. 86 2 Where the requested act is within
the line of duty of the person performing it, the court does
not consider him entitled to the reward.86 But where a public
official is involved, he is entitled to the reward if the act per-
formed is not one of his legal duties, and if the information
furnished has not been obtained from the records of his office. 864
United States marshall offers a reward for the arrest of a fugitive from
his custody, he acts as a principal, and although he may have signed with
the addition of the words, U.S. Marshall, he cannot avoid liability."
359. 5 La. 397, 25 Am. Dec. 187n. (1833).
360. 22 La. Ann. 338 (1870).
361. Of. Cornelson v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 7 La. Ann. 345 (1852): "The
offer of a reward for a crime to be committed is unusual, and the terms
used refer to a past offense. Besides, the reward related to a specific crime
and not one less in degree and entirely different. Defendant's obligation
cannot be enlarged by implication and extended to cases not embraced
within the offer."
362. Protti v. American Bank & Trust Co., 179 La. 39, 153 So. 13 (1934).
363. Taylor v. American Bank & Trust Co., 17 La. App. 458, 133 So. 402,
reV'd, 135 So. 47 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931). In this decision, the court accepted
the distinction introduced between rewards offered by private persons and
those offered by the legislature. Quoting from United States v. Matthews,
173 U.S. 381 (1899), the court said: "The broad difference between the right
of an officer to take from a private individual a reward or compensation
for the performance of his official duty, and the capacity of such officer
to receive a reward expressly authorized by competent legislative authority,
and sanctioned by the executive officer to whom the legislative power has
delegated ample discretion to offer the reward, is too obvious to require
anything but statement." The court found that a municipal ordinance
prohibits the receipt of such a reward by a public police officer, i. at 48.
See Note, Rewards-Communication of Offer and Time of Acceptance, 16
LA. L. REV. 820-824 (1942).
364. Pilie v. New Orleans, 19 La. Ann. 274 (1867).
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Apparently, the specific problem of the legal nature of the
public offer of a reward has never been expressly considered
by a Louisiana court. However, at least in one decision there
is some language indicating that cases of this kind should fall
within the contractual framework,36 5 thereby requiring knowl-
edge of the offer by the person performing the requested act,
in order to obtain his "consent." It is submitted that the obliga-
tion deriving from such a public promise should be considered
legal and not contractual. Authority to support this view can
be found by generalizing the doctrine underlying Article 1809
of the Louisiana Civil Code in order to reach the conclusion
that obligations based on the promisor's unilateral declaration
of will are not inconsistent with the spirit of the Louisiana law.
This interpretation justifies the conclusion that the reward is
to be granted to a person who performs the requested act with-
out knowledge of the promise. It also helps to clarify the prob-
lem of the effectiveness of the revocation of the public offer
of a reward, as publication of the withdrawal by the same means
and for the same time as the offer would suffice.866 If several
persons contribute to the success of the act requested by the
promisor, each of them should be entitled to a share of the
reward.8 0
365. Taylor v. American Bank & Trust Co., 17 La. App. 458, 133 So. 402,
reVd, 135 So. 47, 49 (1931): "There is a vast distinction between permitting
a police officer to retain a reward tendered after the performance of service,
and authorizing such officer to bring suit for reward as upon contract."
(Emphasis added.) In Note, Communication of Offer and Time of Accep-
tance, 16 LA. L. REV. 824 n.13 (1942), the three following alternatives are
suggested: "(1) Enact a statute similar to the German provision. (2) It
would be possible, unless specific terms to the contrary were contained
in the offer itself, to interpret a reward offer as an offer to pay for a
result rather than an offer to contract for a result, the only acceptance
necessary being the submission of a claim after performance has been
rendered. (3) In addition, the proper result could be achieved by reliance
on the concept of quasi-contract embodied in LA. CIVIL CODS art. 2294 (1870)."
It should be noticed that in the case of the third alternative, recovery would
amount to the promisor's enrichment, and not necessarily to the reward
offered.
366. Cf. Murphy v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 323 (1856): The city ordi-
nance June 28, 1813 offering a fixed reward for the apprehension and
conviction of persons guilty of arson, was not to be temporary, but must
have effect until repealed. Compare with Loring v. The City of Boston, 7
Met. (Mass.) 409 (1844).
367. In Taylor v. American Bank & Trust Co., 17 La. App. 458, 133
So. 402, reVd, 135 So. 47 (1931), the trial court had rendered judgment in
favor of the various claimants each for his virile share of the total
reward of $5,000. Id. at 49. In Van Buren v. Citizens Bank, 6 Rob. 379
(La. 1844), it was decided that plaintiff, who arrested and procured the
conviction of one of several persons engaged in circulating certain counter-
feit bills, was entitled to the reward that had already been paid to another
who also undertook the same endeavour in relation to other of the
individuals concerned. Although defendant argued that the reward had not
80 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
In contests for prizes, the one entering a contest and ful-
filling all the requirements of the offer as advertised in a news-
paper creates a valid binding contract under which he is entitled
to the promised reward.868 The rules of such a contest, in case
of dispute, must be interpreted against the one who prepared
them, exactly as in the stipulations of a contract.869 The closing
of the contest before the announced term, without the con-
testants' consent, amounts to a breach that entitles them to
recover damages.870
been offered for the conviction of more than one person, the court felt that
because of certain ambiguity in the notice published In English and French,
plaintiff was entitled to recover. Compare with the solution suggested in
German doctrine, aupra 73.
368. Schreiner v. Well Furniture Co., 68 So.2d 149 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1953), where the court invoked LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1803 (1870).
369. Id. at 152: "Where there is a dispute over what are the provisions
of a contract or what the stipulations mean, a document must be inter-
preted against the one who prepared it." LA. CrIL CODE arts. 1957 and 1958(1870).
370. Youngblood v. Daily and Weekly Signal Tribune, 131 So. 604 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1930).
